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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF THE LAWFULLY
ADMITTED PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN:
THE PRE-1917 CASES*
SIEGFRIED HESSEt
Theory is the most important part of the dogma of the law, as the
architect is the most important man who takes part in the building
of a house .... It is not to be feared as unpractical for, to the com-
petent, it simply means going to the bottom of the subject.
Mr. Justice Holmes'
AF-rER the decision of the Supreme Court in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy 2
in 1952, the power of Congress to expel long-term resident aliens seemed a
firmly settled constitutional concept.3 Harisiades involved three aliens, all of
whom had entered the United States, as minors, prior to 1921. During their
residence in this country, each had joined the Communist Party. One resigned
in 1929 and another in 1938, while the third was expelled in 1939, although
he still believed in party principles. Not having acted against them earlier,
the Government moved in 1946 to expel them 4 under the Alien Registration
Act of 1940,5 which made former membership in an organization advocating
overthrow of the government by force or violence grounds for an alien's ex-
pulsion.6 The act, as applied, was upheld by the Harisiades majority, which
determined that congressional power in this area was "largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference."7 Deportation of a long-term resident alien
was variously viewed as a matter of the war and foreign relations powers,
"inherent sovereignty," and "the maintenance of a-republican form of govern-
ment." But only two years later the question was reconsidered in Galvan v.
*The first of two Articles by the author. The second will appear in an early issue of
volume 69.
-Managing Legal Editor, California Continuing Education of the Bar. The views ex-
pressed here are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent those of either the
State Bar of California or the University of California Extension, which administers the
program.
1. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HA v. L. REv. 457, 477 (1897).
2. 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
3. See Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692 (1957) ; Lehmann v. United States
ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685 (1957) ; Rabang v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427 (1957) ; Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1.955).
4. 342 U.S. at 581-83.
5. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670. Portions of this act are still in force, but the deportation
provisions are now found, with some changes, in the Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, § 241, 66 Stat. 204-08, 8 UTS.C. § 1251 (1952).
6. Ch. 439, 54 Stat. 670, 673 (1940) ; see 342 U.S. at 588 n.15.
7. 342 U.S. at 587-89.
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Press,8 with the same result. In 1956, Rowoldt v. Perfetto 9 reopened it again,
but questionable statutory construction avoided both banishment and the con-
stitutional issue.10 Thus, the peacetime status of the long-term resident alien
remains subject to examination.
It is appropriate, therefore, both to determine what has caused the Court's
dilemma between its own recent precedents and the extremity of banishment,
and, more important, to suggest a more fitting constitutional view of congres-
sional power in the conflict between the legitimate need for regulation of im-
migration and the rights of resident aliens.'
Strangely enough, not until Harisiades did the Court sanction banishment
in the face of substantive due process objections.'2 The inquiry undertaken,
however, is not to establish that the early judicial statements there relied upon
were dicta, but rather that the actual theory of the prior cases rested upon a
rationale which does not support the result there reached.
8. 347 U.S. 522 (1954).
9. 355 U.S. 115 (1957).
10. The questions presented were the sufficiency of the evidence, and whether Galvan
should be overruled. The majority opinion only considered the first question. Id. at 1.16,
120. The dissenting opinion noted and rejected the latter question although reserving
decision on the scope of substantive due process limitations for future cases. Id. at 126.
11. Since the inquiry involves constitutional questions, stare decisis raises no insur-
mountable barrier. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944); Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 405-11 (1932) (dissenting opinion of Brandeis, J.). This
is particularly true in this area, since the recent opinions purport to be based on prece-
dents developed under significantly different legislation. While the basic view espoused
here is different, the debt owed to the late Louis B. Boudin for his germinal study, The
Settler Within Our Gates (pts. 1-3), 26 N.Y.U.L. Rxv. 266, 451, 634 (1951.), is as ex-
tensive as it is obvious. His position was rejected in Harisiades, although, in view of
Rowoldt, the substantive due process argument remains vital. For a post-Harisiades state-
ment of this argument, see Bullitt, Deportation as a Denial of Substantive Due Process,
28 WASH. L. REv. 205 (1953).
Valuable sociological material is available in LoWENrSTEIN, THE ALIEN AND THE IM-
MIGRATION LAW 164-284 (1957) ; Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, Political
Deportations in the United States, 14 LAW. GUILD REv. 93 (1954), supplemented (With
some overlap in cases covered) by Appendix to Brief for Petitioner, Rowoldt v. Perfetto,
355 U.S. 115 (1.957).
There has been surprisingly little academic interest in immigration law generally. See
Oppenheimer, Book Review, 65 YALE L.J. 115 (1955). The recent decisions have been
criticized, but primarily on the basis of policy, rather than power. See, e.g., Comment,
20 U. CHI. L. Ray. 547 (1953); Note, 37 MINN. L. REv. 440 (1953). The President's
Commission likewise did not question congressional power. See U.S. PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N
ON ITMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, REPORT-WHoM WE SHALL WELCOME 175 (1953)
[hereinafter cited as PRESIENT'S COmi'N REP.]. See generally ALEXANDER, RIGHTS oF
ALIENS UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1931); KONVITZ, CIVIL RIGHTS IN, IMI-
GRATION (1953), and THE ALIEN AND THE ASIATIC IN AMERICAN LAW (1946). See
SMITH, FumDom's FETTEs (1956) ; MILLER, CRIsIs IN FREEDOM (1951), concerning the
Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798.
12. But see S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1950) (The expulsion "power
is -not dependent upon the existence of statutory conditions as to his [the alien's] right
to remain at the time he became a resident," citing United States v. Sui Joy, 240 Fed.
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Two cases, Fong Yue Ting v. United States'3 and Bugajewitz v. Adams,'4
are the twin foundations upon which the current constitutional theory of un-
limited congressional power over all aliens is erected. 15 A third, Keller v.
United States,16 held an attempted exercise of the power to regulate immigra-
tion unconstitutional on substantive grounds. Perhaps because the legislation
voided in Keller involved criminal penalties for both citizens and aliens, rather
than expulsion of aliens, 17 its potentially far-reaching significance has been
totally ignored since shortly after its pronouncement. This study will under-
take to show that neither Fong Yuc Ting nor Bugajewitz unquestionably
supports Harisiades, but that both can be harmonized with the Keller ration-
ale, which is totally inconsistent with (and not mentioned in) Harisiades.
The Problem of Definition
There is nothing startling about returning a person to his native country
shortly, or a few years, after arrival when he was erroneously allowed to
enter, or achieved his residence fraudulently or by other illegal means. On
the other hand, when admittance is attained lawfully and properly, and the
entire life of a human being, or several human beings, is changed as a con-
sequence, the retraction of the right to permanent residence suggests a dif-
ferent constitutional picture.
Failure to appreciate the distinction between these qualitatively different
situations has been, at least in part, the by-product of the failure to distinguish
between different types of expulsion. Drawing a distinction only between ex-
clusion and expulsion, the Court has accepted as useful in immigration cases
the term "exclusion," meaning "preventing someone from entering the United
States who is actually outside of the United States or is treated as being so";
the term "expulsion," meaning "forcing someone out of the United States
who is actually within the United States or is treated as being so"; and the
term "deportation," signifying "the moving of someone away from the United
States, after exclusion or expulsion."' 8
This usage of "expulsion," however, lumps the illegally and erroneously
admitted resident together with the long-term, lawful resident. It blurs, and
impliedly negatives, any difference in constitutional status. In this Article, for
purposes of clarity, the expulsion of one who either entered illegally, or who,
within a reasonable time after entry, committed acts justifying the conclusion
392 (9th Cir. 1917). The case involved the power to expel from Hawaii persons who had
established residence there prior to its annexation. It is distinguishable from the views
presented hereafter, since there had never been an opportunity for an initial screening).
13. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
14. 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
15. See Developments in the Law--Imnigration and Nationality, 66 HArv. L. Rv.
643, 681 (1953).
16. 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
17. Id. at 139.
18. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.4 (1953).
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that entry was erroneously allowed, will be termed "ejection." The expulsion
of one who committed an act which either by its nature, or by its temporal
remoteness to entry, affords no basis for a presumption of initial excludability
will be termed "banishment."' 19 When "expulsion" is used hereafter, it is
meant to include both ejection and banishment.
Banishment and Statutory Construction
Strict construction of expulsion statutes is an accepted principle.2 0 Often
used to prevent harsh results, strict construction appears to be an implicit, if
unarticulated, recognition of the distinction between ejection and banishment.2 '
It also seems to explain why few expulsion cases seriously broach the ques-
tion of substantive limits to congressional power. The interests of the alien
involved are far better served by counsel's urging a statutory loophole than
by an attack on broad doctrinal grounds. As a consequence, the constitutional
issues presented by expulsion have been considered only in cases involving
extremely unpopular groups of aliens, whose very unpopularity has led to
their explicit inclusion within the orbit of congressional intent. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that the leading immigration cases seriously considering
constitutional issues have, in historical order, involved Chinese laborers,
22
19. That expulsion may constitute banishment has been repeatedly recognized, al-
though no legal distinction has yet followed. See, e.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U'S. 637,
642 (1954) ; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954) ; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333
U.S. 6, 10 (194); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 281 (1922); Madison, Report
on the Virginia Resolutions, 4 ELLIOT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 555
(1866) [hereinafter cited as ELLIor's DEBATES].
20. "Although not penal in character, deportation statutes as a practical matter may
inflict 'the equivalent of banishment or exile' . . . and should be strictly construed." Bar-
ber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637, 642-43 (1954) ; see Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223,
231 (1951) ; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10 (1948) ; Delgadillo v. Carmichael,
332 U.S. 388, 391. (1947). This type of reasoning is fully displayed in the opinion of
Judge L. Hand in Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, 158 F.2d 878, 879 (2d Cir. 1947).
21. The opinion in Rowoldt v. Perfetto, 355 U.S. 115 (1957), is a recent example
of the method by which the courts seek to avoid the banishment of long-term residents.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, holding that Congress had not intended to authorize deportation
of the petitioner, stated that "the differences on the facts between Galvan v. Press ...
and this case are too obvious to be detailed." Id. at 121. In fact, the evidence in support
of the contention that an expellable act was committed seems stronger in Rowoldt. Com-
pare id. at 127-30 with the facts in Galvan v. Press, 347 U:S. 522, 524 (1954). Rowoldt
was "an old man who has lived in this country for forty years." 355 U.S. at 120. This
fact would be irrelevant under the current view of the extent of Congress' constitutional
powers over aliens, and only by strained construction could it be at all relevant to con-
gressional intent in the statute involved, Internal Security Act of 1950, ch. 1024, § 22, 64
Stat. 1006. The substance of the relevant provisions was incorporated into Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, §§ 212(a),(28)-(29) (exclusion), 241(a) (6)-(7) (deporta-
tion), 66 Stat. 184, 205, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a) (28)-(29), 1251(a) (6)-(7) (1952).
22. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
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anarchists, 28 prostitutes,24 convicted wartime saboteurs, 25 and, in the present
decade, ex-communists.
26
Thus, congressional power to eject and banish has been contested only
under the most unfavorable circumstances. The fact that principles of law
arise out of hard or sordid cases does not mean that they are wrong,27 but
it does justify a careful scrutiny of the cases. 28
SOURCES OF FEDERAL POWER OVER ALIENS
There are some phenomena to which it is not enough to assign one
cause: we must enumerate several, though in fact there is only one.
Lucretius 20
It is striking that no power to regulate immigration is specifically men-
tioned in the Constitution."0 This, however, does not automatically establish
congressional omnipotence over aliens. It might equally suggest an absence
of power to expel except in time of war. This view, in fact, enjoyed the sup-
port of both Madison 3' and Jefferson.
32
Aside from the naturalization power, four sources of an implied power to
expel have been suggested: the war power, the foreign commerce power, the
treaty power, and sovereignty itself. Absent a governing treaty or war, how-
ever, the foreign commerce power seems the only proper basis for expulsion.
23. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
24. Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585
(1913); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U.S.
460 (1912).
25. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
26. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954) ; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580
(1952).
27. But see Boudin, supra note 11, at 651-52, quoting from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68 (1940) (sordid cases make bad
law).
28. To root up all those associations which we call home, to banish him [the alien]
to be an outcast in a country of whose traditions and habits he knows nothing,
and where his alienage is a daily, living fact, not a legal imputation-these are
consequences whose warrant we may properly scrutinize with some jealousy, and
insist that logic shall not take the place of understanding.
United States ex rel. Mignozzi v. Day, 51 F.Zd 1019, 1021 (2d Cir. 1931) (L. Hand, J.).
29. LucETrius, TiE NATUps OF THE UNmVERSE 238 (Latham transl. 1951). (Italics
deleted.)
30. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 599 (1952) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
31. "With respect to aliens who are not enemies, but members of nations in peace and
amity with the United States, the power assumed by the ['Alien) act [of 1798] of Con-
gress is denied to be constitutional, . . ." Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions,
4 ELmior's DEBrzTs 546, 554.
32. "[A]lien friends are under the jurisdiction and protection of the laws of the state
wherein they are; ... no power over them has been delegated to the United States ...
[accordingly] the [Alien] act [of 1798] .. .is not law, but is altogether void and of no
force." Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, 4 id. at 540-41. See also John-




The power "to establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization" 3 is sometimes
suggested, together with sovereignty, as a source of power over immigration.3 4
Recent expulsion cases have found significance in the fact that the aliens be-
fore the Court had not become naturalized. These cases hint that failure to
attain citizenship can justify banishment.35 In times closer to the adoption of
the Constitution, however, the existence of permanent residents who were not
naturalized was accepted.30 Thus, in 1799, judge Iredell implied that the right
to remain depended only upon prescribed behavior for a limited probationary
period,3 7 after which the resident noncitizen would not even have been sub-
ject to the Alien Act of 1798.
3 8
A finding that the naturalization power affords no affirmative basis for ex-
pulsion would not empty the power of content. Rights and privileges attend
naturalization; for example, the vote and the passport. The distinction be-
tween resident citizens and resident aliens is meaningful, therefore, without
assuming an unlimited power to expel the latter without regard to the dura-
tion of their stay.
The War Power
In time of war all powers of the federal government, including authority
over resident aliens, are necessarily augmented.3 9 Expulsion under the war
power began with the Enemy Alien Act of 1798,40 which remains today sub-
stantially unchanged. 41 The power to remove under this act, while exercisable
33. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
34. See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 599 (1952) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941) (dictum).
35. E.g., Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 585 (1952). See also Carlson v.
Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952). This rationale was first proposed in 1893. Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893).
36. See The Naturalization Act of 1790, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103.
37. [If] during a limited time ... [an alien] has behaved as a man of a good moral
character, attached to the principles of the constitution of the United States, and
well disposed to the good order and happiness of the same. ... he is no object of
the alien law to which the objection is applied, because he is not a person whom
the president is empowered to remove, for such a person could not be deemed
dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, nor could there be reason-
able grounds to suspect such a man of being concerned in any treasonable or secret
machinations against the government, in which cases alone the removal of any alien
friend is authorized.
Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 834-35 (No. 5126) ('C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (charge to jury).
38. Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
39. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768-69 (1950) (recounting traditional
hostility to alien in time of war). See also Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch.)
110 (1814).
40. Ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577. It is not to be confused with the Alien Act of 1798, ch. 58,
1 Stat. 570.
41. See REv. STAT. §§ 4067-70 (1875), as amended, 50 U.S.C. §§ 21-24 (1952).
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absent actual hostilities, 42 is limited to periods of war or the imminent threat
of war, and cannot be employed once the state of war is officially ended.
43
A fundamental distinction therefore exists between removal under the
Enemy Alien Act and peacetime expulsion.44 But the careful restriction of
warpower deportation statutes to current defense needs has not always been
attempted. For example, the Alien Act of 1798,4 5 which authorized the re-
moval of resident aliens of neutral and even friendly nations, was supported
by its proponents on the ground that it was designed to cope with future
hostilities.46 The Act of May 10, 1920,47 presented the converse of this situa-
tion. Not part of the general immigration law,48 the act was a direct result
of World War I. It applied only to interned aliens, and aliens who had been,
or who might thereafter be, convicted of certain wartime crimes. Its purpose,
moreover, was to sanction deportation under the Enemy Alien Act even after
the ratification of the then-pending peace treaty.
49
The validity of this act was questioned in Mahler v. Eby,'0 a habeas corpus
proceeding brought by a group of aliens who had been convicted of violating
the Espionage and Selective Service Acts. Their principal contention was that
the statutory phrase, "undesirable resident," a finding of which constituted a
ground for expulsion, was too vague a standard to satisfy the due process
requirements for a delegation of power to the executive.51 In remanding the
case, the Court did not adopt this approach, however. It construed the clause
as incorporating the basic exclusion policies of existing and past statutes and
held that, although the convictions might justify a finding that petitioners
were "undesirable residents," the expulsion orders were invalid because the
Secretary of Labor had made no express finding to that effect.52
42. Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 166-70 (1948).
43. United States ex rel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, 342 U.S. 347 (1952).
44. Compare Citizens Protective League v. Clark, 155 F.2d 290, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1946),
with United States ex tel. Jaegeler v. Carusi, supra note 43.
45. Ch. 58, 1. Stat. 570.
46. See Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 832-35 (No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799) (charge
to jury) ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 747 (1893) (dissenting opinion
of Field, J.). The constitutionality of the Alien Act of 1798 has long been questioned.
See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 171 n.18 (1948) (dictum) ; United States cx rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 294-95 (1904) (dictum); Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 610-11 (1889) (dictum).
47. Ch. 1.74, 41 Stat. 593.
48. The provisions of the 1920 act were, however, included in the recodification of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241(a) (17), 66 Stat. 207, 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(a) (17) (1952).
49. See United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 532 (1950),
where it was also noted that "the Government refers to this [the Enemy Alien] Act in
its argument in interpreting the Act of May 10, 1920, as in pari matera... ." Id. at 526
n.10. See also Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 167-68 n.12, 179-81 (1948).
50. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
51. See id at 37.
52. Id. at 40-44. It is interesting to note that the lack of such findings had not been
assigned as error. Id. at 45. The Court also noted that had the aliens been mere internees
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The 1920 act, with which Mahler deals, was significant primarily because
it was the first retroactive addition of grounds for expulsion not expressly
related to a preexisting ground of exclusion.53 But to justify the legislation,
the existence of an implied restriction imposed at the time of entry, that the
immigrant will not engage in conduct harmful to the nation during time of
war, might have been suggested.
5 4
Decided solely as a matter of statutory construction, Mahler cannot be
understood to resolve the question of the status of the resident alien under
either the war power or the general immigration laws.55 No doubt the resident
alien is subject to the war power even after war has come to an end. But,
while the courts are reluctant to review congressional determinations of what
constitutes a threat to national security justifying the use of the war power,5 6
it is submitted that when an alien's right to remain is at stake, a court may
justifiably require that regulations under that power be reasonably related to
the danger feared, and that the individual alien be given an opportunity to
demonstrate that he is not a member of the dangerous group.57 The nature
instead of convicted saboteurs, a finding that they were "undesirable residents" might not
have been justified. Id. at 42.
53. See text at notes 205-54 infra for an analysis of the legislative history of ex-
clusion and expulsion.
54. Compare Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 834-35 (No. 5126) (1C.C.D. Pa. 1799)
(Alien Act of 1798).
55. Admittedly, Mahler has been construed as settling any possible constitutional
issue. See United States ex rcl. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 529 & n.15
(1950). But the relators in Eichenlaub did not raise a constitutional issue, relying instead
on the contention that the 1920 act did not apply to them since they had been naturalized
citizens at the time of their convictions, Brief for Relator, pp. 9-23. Thus the language
regarding the extent of congressional power over aliens in Eiclienlaub can be regarded
as dicta or, at best, hastily considered. Yet Eiclentlaub has since been cited to uphold the
constitutionality of various exercises of power over aliens. See, e.g., Mulcahey v. Catal-
anotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694 n.5 (1957) (permanent resident convicted of illicit traffic in
narcotics in 1925 deportable under 1952 immigration and naturalization act) ; Rabang v.
Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 433 (1957) (permanent resident since 1930 deportable due to viola-
tion of narcotic laws in 1951); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 n.18 (1952) (ex-
pulsion of resident alien Communists).
56. Cf. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 93-94 (1943).
57. See Rostow, The Japanese-Americaa Cases-A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489
(1945). Should Congress seek to justify legislation such as that involved in Galvan v.
Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), under the war power, this substantive due process standard
would work as follows: if the Court assumes that Congress intended to deport all those
who had ever been Communists regardless of whether they now retain enough of the
Party's beliefs to constitute a danger, then the act cannot be justified as a regulation of
aliens under the war power and becomes one prescribing punishment for past activities,
to be tested against the standards of cruel and unusual punishment, the prohibition
against ex post facto laws, and other safeguards. If, on the other hand, the Court as-
sumes that Congress intended to authorize deportation of only those aliens whose pres-
ence constitutes a present danger, then the irrebuttable presumption that an alien who
was once a Communist remains a substantial threat to national security is invalid when
applied to an alien who can show that he, together with others in his precise situation,
15851959]
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of the war power, moreover, would seem to require the employment of the
least amount of power appropriate to the ends sought. 5 Thus, the source of
congressional power to expel resident aliens in peacetime would ordinarily be
discovered elsewhere.
Sovereignty
The highest barrier to a fresh consideration of the long-term resident alien's
status is the doctrine that congressional power over aliens is inherent in
sovereignty. Thus regarded, the power is extraconstitutional, and is measured
only by the principles of international law. Given this view, it is pointless to
discuss possible substantive limits to the power, since the traditional rule of
international law is that the expelled alien's only remedy is the diplomatic
protest of his native state.59 It is the purpose of the immediate discussion,
therefore, to establish that the concept of sovereignty as developed in the early
cases did not concern the power of the federal governmnt over the domestic
resident alien population, but rather a power of the federal government in the
field of international relations-the power to remove a citizen of another coun-
try over the country's objections.60 These cases upheld the power to e-xclude or
eject Chinese laborers, treaty rights notwithstanding. They did not answer the
question of the rights of the individual resident alien under our domestic con-
stitutional law.61
When an alien claims to be entitled to enter or remain because of rights
created by treaty with his native country, as did the Chinese laborers in the
landmark cases, his rights may properly be determined on the basis of inter-
national law. The issues presented are clearly within the field of foreign re-
does not pose such a threat. Using either approach, the results of Galvan could be
avoided.
Substantive due process limits were recently imposed on the war power in Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (expatriation case). Mr. Justice Brennan, concurring, id. at
105-14, states the reasoning behind the result most clearly.
58. Cf. United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 23 (1955). Admittedly,
the conception of what can be done under the war power has expanded in recent years.
See, e.g., Act of June 21, 1941, 55 Stat. 252, 22 U.S.C. § 233 (1952), making the restric-
tions which then existed on the rights of both citizens and aliens to leave the United
States in time of war applicable in periods of "national emergency." Regulations under
this act were upheld in two exclusion cases. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953) ; United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
The harsh results reached in these cases have been severely criticized. See, e.g., Bullitt,
supra note 11, at 210-13 (discussing Mezei).
As to power over citizens under the war powers, see Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283
(1944) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) ; Hirabayashi v. United States,
320 U.S. 81 (1943).
59. See BRIGGS, LAW OF NATION S 536-38 and authorities cited (2d ed. 1952).
60. See Boudin, supra note 11, at 473-74; text at notes 79-81, 87-88 infra.
61. "The supposedly absolute power is only absolute with respect to outside powers
or foreigners not within our territory. It is not absolute with. respect to the power itself,
and its exercise must always be justified in our courts under the Constitution." Boudin,
sapra note 11, at 461.
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lations and the treaty power.62 On the other hand, international law alone
cannot dispose of the rights of the lawful resident alien who claims no pro-
tection by virtue of his nativity. His rights must be tested with reference to
the Constitution.
From the first, the doctrine of inherent sovereignty concerned the ability of
the United States to function as a nation in international affairs. The powers
necessary to carrying on international relations were implied from the national
sovereignty when not expressly delegated by the Constitution. 63 As immigra-
tion necessarily affects both foreign commerce and foreign relations, early
state statutes regulating the entrance of aliens were held invalid,64 even though
Congress had not yet legislated on the subject.65
Subsequently, Congress' first attempt to exercise its power over immigra-
tion, the enactment of a "head tax" on immigrants, 6 was upheld as a regu-
lation of foreign commerce in the Head Money Cases.67 The Court made this
clear in disposing of the argument that the statute was invalid under the tax
power: "[Tjhe power exercised in this instance is not the taxing power. The
burden imposed on the ship-owner by this statute is the mere incident of the
regulation of commerce-of that branch of foreign commerce which is in-
volved in immigration." 6
The contention that the act violated existing treaties was also rejected, on
the ground that the enforcement of international agreements was beyond the
competence of a domestic court which was bound by the last utterance of its
own sovereign on the subject. 9 This holding affords a focus for the first ex-
clusion and ejection cases, which soon followed.
The Yellow Hordes Theory of Exclusion
The Act of May 6, 1882,70 excluding Chinese laborers, did not apply to
those then within the United States. To facilitate their reentry, certificates
of identity were prescribed. These certificates were later made the exclusive
means of establishing the right of Chinese laborers to reenter.71 The Act of
62. With respect to the treaty power as a source of immigration power, see text at
notes 139-45 infra.
63. See, e.g., Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11. U.1S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812).
64. Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1876). Henderson v. Mayor of the City
of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 273 (1876).
65. In the case of health and quarantine laws, state regulatory power exists at least
until Congress has acted. See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Board
of Health, 186 U.S. 380, 391 (1902).
66. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (1883).
67. Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 590-91, 593-94 (1884).
68. Id. at 595.
69. Id. at 597-99.
70. Ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58.
71. Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 5, 23 Stat. 115, 116. This act was held inapplicable
to those who had been residents at the time of the 1880 treaty with China, but had de-
parted prior to the enactment of the Exclusion Act of 1882 and remained outside of the
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Oct. 1, 1888,72 finally prohibited entry to Chinese laborers, certificates of
identity notwithstanding. The validity of this act was challenged in Chae Chan
Ping v. United States.
73
The major constitutional questions raised in this case were whether any
nation can exclude foreigners, and whether the treaties, pursuant to which
the prior acts providing for certificates of identity were enacted, gave those
before the Court a vested right to reenter. 74 Although counsel for the aliens
attempted to raise a fifth amendment point, 7a the Court treated the case as
though the only issues were the exclusion power under international law, and
the right of the United States to abrogate treaty privileges.
Mr. Justice Field, writing for a unanimous court, first outlined the treaties
between the United States and China concerning immigration,7 and, with
regard to the Chinese laborers covered by these treaties, observed:
[T]hey remained strangers in the land, residing apart by themselves, and
adhering to the customs and usages of their own country. It seemed im-
possible for them to assimilate with our people or to make any change in
their habits or modes of living. As they grew in numbers each year the
people of the coast saw, or believed they saw, ... great danger that at
no distant day that portion of our country would be overrun by them
unless prompt action was taken to restrict their immigration.
77
This is the genesis of the self-preservation theory as applied to the regulation
of immigration-the theory of nonassimilable yellow hordes.
With respect to the power to abrogate treaty rights, the opinion closely
followed the Head Money Cases.78 The issue thus narrowed to congressional
power independent of any treaty restrictions, the opinion continued:
That the government of the United States, through the action of the
legislative department, can exclude aliens from its territory is a proposi-
tion which we do not think open to controversy. Jurisdiction over its own
territory to that extent is an incident of every independent nation. It is
a part of independence. If it could not exclude aliens it would be to that
extent subject to the control of another power.
7 9
Since congressional power to exclude under the foreign commerce power
had already been recognized, discussion of the power of independent nations
must have been intended to serve some other purpose. It seems clear that Mr.
Justice Field was simply answering counsel's assertion that no nation can
United States until after the enactment of the 1884 act. Chew Heong v. United States,
112 U.S. 536 (1884).
72. Ch. 1064, 25 ,Stat. 504.
73. (The Chinese Exclusion Case) 130 U.S. 581 (1889). For an account of the en-
forcement difficulties that led to progressive tightening of the regulations, see id. at
598-99.
74. See Brief for Appellant, 32 L. Ed. 1069.
75. See 130 U.S. at 584, 586 (argument for appellant).
76. Id. at 590-95.
77. Id. at 595.
78. Id. at 600.
79. Id. at 603-04.
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exclude under international law,80 for the next paragraph of the opinion
turned to the constitutional delegation of federal power, itemizing some of the
major provisions of article I, section 8, primarily the war, treaty, foreign
commerce, and naturalization powers, as attributes of sovereignty.8 ' To this
point, then, there is nothing in the opinion to suggest that Congress' power
to exclude rests on any ground other than the authority delegated by the Con-
stitution. In what followed, however, the specific basis upon which the act was
upheld became blurred. The Court, likening Asiatic immigration to imminent
aggression, invoked war-power concepts to uphold peacetime exclusion.
82
But the question of power to exclude in peacetime had already been im-
plicitly settled, since the power to regulate immigration as part of foreign
commerce necessarily encompassed the power to exclude undesirables, such as
criminals, paupers, and diseased persons, categories already specifically recog-
nized.8 3 The 1888 act, however, was based on race rather than any personal
defect. It was not unnatural, therefore, particularly in view of the prevailing
prejudice on the Pacific coast towards resident Chinese,84 that the Court en-
dorsed the yellow-peril theory upon which the act was predicated.8 5
Admittedly, quasi-war concepts were later uncritically applied to ejection.
As applied in Chae Chan Ping, however, they did not play a crucial part, for
exclusion clearly deals with the external, political relations of the United
States with other nations.80 It would seem that a meaningful line could be
drawn between the treatment of aliens outside the country and those properly
within its borders. Nevertheless, since Chae Chan Ping first introduced the
confusion between the war and foreign commerce powers, there has been little
attempt to distinguish between them even in cases dealing with the status of
permanent resident aliens.
In any event, the conclusion of the opinion makes it clear that whatever the
power supporting the exclusion, it was constitutionally delegated and did not
arise, extraconstitutionally, from the fact of sovereignty:
80. See Brief for Appellant, 32 L. Ed. 1069. But cf. Supplementary Brief for Appel-
lant, 130 U.S. at 585.
81. 130 U.S. at 604.
82. Id. at 606. Thus, the first exclusion cases were founded, in part at least, on a
presumption that Asiatic persons were nonassimilable as a matter of law, a fact which
has been disproven by subsequent history. See PRESIDENTS Comm'N REP. 96.
83. See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 590-91 (1884).
84. See generally Yanklvich, Social Attitudes as Reflected in Early California Law,
10 HASINGs L.J. 250, 257-64 (1959).
85. As to the duty of the courts to accept the racism, xenophobia, or religious intoler-
ance of Congress, see Mr. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy,
342 U.S. 580, 597 (1952). Congress may still be unduly race-conscious. See S. REP. No.
1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-12 (1950). See also PESIDENeT'S Comm'N REP. 91-94.
86. By explicitly equating the status of reentering Chinese laborers with those seeking
initial entry, the Court in Chae Chan Ping laid the basis for the doctrine of reentry. But,
since those involved in the case were relying on their foreign nationality, they were in a
different category from modern immigrants. A critique of the reentry doctrine, however,
is beyond the scope of the present inquiry.
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The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty
belonging to the government of the United States, as a part of those
sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise
. . . cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of anyone. The
powers of government are delegated in trust to the United States, and
are incapable of transfer to any other parties. They cannot be abandoned
or surrendered .... 87
Thus, the power to exclude could not be restricted by treaty so as to hinder
the protection of the people who granted it. Clearly, then, the discussion con-
cerning sovereignty in the opinion related not to the question of the extent
of constitutional power over the people, but rather to the power under inter-
national law with respect to China.
A further point must be noted with regard to Chae Chan Ping. It was
stated that a government which feels dissatisfied with the treatment accorded
its subjects may seek redress through diplomatic channels.88 Since the case
involved parties who were asserting rights as subjects of a foreign nation pro-
tected by treaty, the theory had relevance to the issues presented. But it is
not applicable to cases involving permanent residents admitted solely as the
result of compliance with domestic immigration laws.
The Conditional Entry Theory of Expulsion
The application of the principles of exclusion to cases of expulsion may be
traced to a dictum of Mr. Justice Gray in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States,80
a case involving the public charge clause of the exclusion provisions of the
Act of March 3, 1891.90
It is an accepted maxim of international law, that every sovereign
nation has power, as inherent in sovereignty, and essential to self-preser-
vation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to
admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see
fit.... In the United States this power is vested in the national govern-
ment, to which the Constitution has committed the entire control of in-
ternational relations .... It ... may be exercised either through treaties
. . . or through statutes . . . . [T]he Constitution has conferred power
[upon Congress] to regulate foreign commerce with foreign nations, in-
cluding . . . the bringing of persons into the ports of the United States;
to establish a uniform rule of naturalization; [and] to declare war.91
This is the first suggestion of a conditional entry theory of expulsion: a
theory that the power to expel is implied from the power to exclude, and is
exercised by imposing conditions upon the right to enter. This power was
recognized both as inherent in sovereignty under international law and as one
87. 130 U.S. at 609. (Emphasis added.)
88. Id. at 606.
89. 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
90. Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
91. 142 U.S. at 659. (Emphasis added.)
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delegated to the federal government by the Constitution. The conditional-entry
concept has been adhered to, at least in theory, ever since.92 The scope of the
immigration power implied in Ekiu is illuminating: first, immigration may be
regulated by exercise of the treaty power; otherwise it is regulated by Con-
gress, which has the power to regulate the coming of persons into our ports.
Once an alien has obtained entrance, he is still subject to regulation with
respect to his naturalization, and he may also become subject to the war
powers of Congress. Certainly nothing more is suggested by the Head Money
Cases or Chae Chan Ping, cited by the Court in support of the quoted pas-
sage.
9 3
This reading of Ekia may cast light on the subsequent ejection case of Fong
Yue Ting v. United States,9 4 of which Gray was again the author. He did
not believe that his views in Fong Yue Ting were inconsistent with Ekiu,
although three dissenters disagreed. An analysis of the divergent views of
Fong Yue Ting will disclose its true meaning.
The Manner and Burden of Proof of Lazqul Entry
Fong Yue Ting involved the validity of section 6 of the Act of May 5,
1892,05 which provided for the procurement of certificates of residence as a
means of identifying which Chinese were in the United States legally after the
absolute exclusion of Chinese immigrants. Failure to have a certificate after a
specific date subjected all Chinese laborers to ejection. The burden of proving
lawful entrance was shifted to all resident Chinese laborers. The testimony of
"at least one credible white witness" was an additional requirement.96 The
92. See, e.g., Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914) ; Lem Moon Sing v. United
States, 158 U.S. 538, 542-43 (1895) ; Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 125 (1923)
(dictum). See also text at note 160 infra.
93. 142 U.S. at 659.
The main issue in Ekia was the delegation of factfinding power to officers of the
Executive branch. In upholding this, the Court seemed to imply that the entrant alien
had a different status than the lawful resident. Id. at 660. The opinion relied on Den ex
dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855),
involving summary procedures in assessing taxes, and Hilton v. Merritt, 110 U.S. 97
(1884), involving the summary procedure authorized in dealing with imports.
The importance of achieving lawful admittance was further emphasized by the opinion's
careful note of the fact that while Ekiu had been taken from the ship upon which she
had arrived, her physical entry did not change her status or affect her right to remain,
for she was "in the same position, so far as regarded her right to land in the United
States, as if she never had been removed from the steamship." 142 U.S. at 661. This
view has been followed ever since. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U.S. 228 (1925); Zar-
tarian v. Billings, 204 U.S. 170 (1.907); cf. Rogers v. Quan, 357 U.S. 193 (1958); Leng
May Ma v. Barber, 357 U.S. 185 (1958).
94. 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
95. Ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25.
96. Ibid. The view that Chinese were not credible witnesses did not enjoy unanimous
acceptance. See Quock Ting v. United States, 140 U.S. 417, 423-24 (1891) (dissenting
opinion).
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issue framed by this statute was whether Congress could eject a resident who
could not prove his status by the testimony of a white witness simply by creat-
ing a conclusive presumption of unlawful entry. Viewed in this manner, the
import of both the majority and minority opinions is more readily determined.
The minority felt that lawfully admitted resident aliens were being ejected,
0 7
while the majority was willing to uphold the provision as a rule of evidence
in exclusion cases justified by the difficulties of proof of unlawful entry and
the unreliability of Chinese witnesses.
98
Despite the narrow issue actually involved, the act was attacked on broad
grounds-that permanently domiciled residents are de facto citizens; that the
act, as applied, constituted banishment; that Chinese laborers enjoyed special
treaty immunities from ejection; that the act violated procedural due process;
that no such peacetime power was delegated to Congress; and that there were
no nondelegated sovereign powers.99
The Government contended that the cases were indistinguishable from Chae
Chan Ping, that shifting of the burden of proof was proper, and that a nation
has unlimited power to regulate and suspend the residence of aliens within
its borders. The last assertion was based entirely on international law au-
thorities.100
With both sides arguing the existence or nonexistence of extraconstitution-
al power, it is not surprising that the majority opinion considered the doctrine
of inherent sovereignty. Moreover, since petitioners relied on their treaty
rights as Chinese nationals and also claimed to be de facto citizens who were
being banished, it was relevant to consider what their rights were under in-
ternational law. The sovereignty approach was also relevant to meet the argu-
ments of the dissenting justices, whose opinions rested in part on an asserted
lack of any power to expel friendly aliens under international law.' 11
Mr. Justice Gray opened the majority opinion by quoting with approval
from the previously analyzed portions of the opinions in Ekit and Chac
Chan Ping dealing with the sovereign rights of nations with respect to im-
migrants.1 2 Thus, he must have considered what was countenanced ift Fong
Yue Ting to be a legitimate extension of the principles that he had enunciated
in Ekhi. Since the parties before the Court had not proved by clear and con-
97. See 149 U.S. at 733, 746, 762 (dissenting opinions of Brewer and Field, JJ., and
Fuller, C.J.). Mr. Justice Harlan did not participate in the decision, as he was in Europe
at the time. His views, however, were apparently in accord with the dissenting justices.
Mr. Justice Field tried, unsuccessfully, to get a fifth vote for the dissenting views in Fong
Yu e Ting after the death of Mr. Justice Blatchford. See Westin, Stephen J. Field and
the Headnote to O'Neil v. Vervwivt: A Snapshot of the Fuller Court At Work, 67 YALE
L.J. 363, 380-83 (1958).
98. 149 U.S. at 729-30.
99. Brief for Petitioners, 37 L. Ed. 908-09.
100. Brief for Respondent, 37 L. Ed. 910.
101. See particularly the opinion of Mr. Justice Field, 149 U.S. at 756-57.
102. 149 U.S. at 705. For the relevant portions of the earlier opinions see quotations
in text at notes 87, 91 supra.
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vincing evidence that they were lawful residents, and that the presumption of
unlawful entry created by lack of a certificate operated contrary to fact, Gray
felt free to judge the reasonableness of the statute as an implementation of
exclusion policies. Nor are the prior opinions necessarily inconsistent with the
assertion that "the right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have
not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the
country, rests upbn the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as
the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country."' 03 View-
ing the case as one of ejection rather than of banishment, this merely equates
the status of unlawful residents to that of immigrants seeking admission, a
development clearly foreshadowed in Ekih.
10 4
The applicability of this equation was not so self-evident to Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Fuller, Mr. Justice Brewer, and Mr. Justice Field, who, assuming that
the aliens in this case were lawful residents, were deciding whether congres-
sional regulatory power could be applied at all to expel these who could not
meet the statute's "evidentiary" requirements. 105 In his short dissent, the Chief
Justice met the issue so framed most squarely, arguing that expulsion could
not be treated identically with exclusion since "limitations exist or are im-
posed upon the deprivation of that which has been lawfully acquired."'10 6
Further, he said, the power to deal arbitrarily with persons lawfully within
the country cannot be derived from "any delegated power, or power implied
therefrom, or .. . supposed inherent sovereignty .... -10T It is a natural
tendency to read the majority opinion as asserting the contrary to these views
so vigorously espoused by the dissenting justices. But a careful reading of
Gray's argument shows that whatever the rights of a sovereign under inter-
national law, congressional power over resident aliens was regarded as con-
stitutionally delegated, and therefore, by implication, constitutionally limited.
Admittedly, after mustering debatable authority in support of the powers of
a sovereign nation to expel, 08 the majority opinion stated:
The right to exclude or expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolute-
ly or upon certain conditions, in war or in peace, being an inherent and
inalienable right of every sovereign and independent nation, essential to
103. 149 U.S. at 707.
104. Mr. Justice Gray's language is admittedly broader than the interpretation offered
here. Nevertheless, the facts of Fong Yue Ting did not require the assertion of the
existence of unlimited congressional power. Arguably, Gray was speaking only of an
unlimited power to expel the presumably illegally admitted aliens then before the Court.
Any further assertion of power can be regarded as dictum.




108. The authority consisted of two diplomatic dispatches, general quotations from
four international law treatises, and two English decisions. 149 U.S. at 707-11. The dis-
patches had been relied on by Mr. Justice Field to support the power to exclude in Chae
Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 607. It is significant that he did not regard them as relevant
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its safety, its independence and its welfare, the question now before the
court is whether the manner in which Congress has exercised this right
in sections 6 and 7 of the Act of 1892 is consistent with the Constitu-
tion. 09
This statement might be interpreted as the final answer to the objections
raised by the dissenting opinions, leaving open only the procedural due process
issue. But instead of resting the decision on the power of 'sovereign nations
to exclude and expel, the next paragraph turned to the question of the con-
stitutional delegation of sovereign powers, discussing it in substantially the
words already quoted from Ekia.i i0 Unless this portion of the opinion is to
be treated as meaningless, it is apparent that the power to regulate resident
aliens was not predicated on nondelegated sovereign power."'l Given that only
delegated power was relied on, the subsequent portion of the opinion can be
analyzed in a manner that lends no support to the recent banishment cases.
The opinion continued:
The power to exclude or to expel aliens, being a power affecting in-
ternational relations, is vested in the political departments of the govern-
when the power to expel was at issue. Field also disagreed with Gray's interpretation of
the treatises, and it would seem from the opinions that their meaning is at least debat-
able. See 149 U.S. at 756-58.
Neither of the English decisions support the conclusions for which they are cited if
Mr. Justice Gray is to be understood as intending to settle the question of the status of
all lawful American residents. The first, In, re Adam, 1 Moore P.C. 460, 12 Eng. Rep.
889 (P.C. 1837), involved the power to eject, from an island conquered from France, a
friendly alien who had been a long-term resident, "but who had not, as required by the
French law, obtained from the colonial government formal and express authority to estab-
lish a domicil there." 149 U.,S. at 710. In modern terms, he had never been lawfully ad-
mitted for permanent residence. An analogous factual situation is presented in United
States v. Sui Joy, 240 Fed. 392 (9th Cir. 1917). When Fong Yue Ting was decided, no
distinction was made at the time of entry between permanent and temporary residence.
Moreover, immigrant Chinese laborers were virtually regarded as temporary residents
as a matter of law, because of their presumed inability to assimilate. If this was Gray's
view, the English decision may be considered in point.
The second case, Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy, [1891] A.C. 272, was an action by
a Chinese immigrant against the collector of customs for the colony of Victoria for re-
fusal to allow admittance. The action was disposed of on the question of whether "an
alien has a legal right, enforceable by action, to enter British territory' 149 U.S. at
710-11. In fact, the British court had expressly said, "A right to deport aliens is not
claimed in this case; it is a right to exclude them which is now in question." [1891]
A.C. at 275. Thus the case can scarcely be considered authority for the power to expel.
109. 149 U.S. at 71l.
110. Id. at 71112; see text at note 91 supra.
111. Thus, Professor Moore interpreted the rule just a few years after Fong Yue
Ting: "The power to regulate immigration is an incident of the sovereign right to expel
or exclude objectionable aliens. The exercise of the power in a particular country is
governed by the constitution and laws. In the United States it belongs to the National
Government as part of its power to regulate commerce." 4 MooRE, DIGEST OF INTMNA-
TioNAL LAw 151 (1906).
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ment, and is to be regulated by treaty or by Act of Congress, and to be
executed by the executive authority according to the regulations so estab-
lished, except so far as the judicial department has been authorized by
treaty or by statute, or is required by the paramount law of the Con-
stitution, to intervene.
In Nishimura Ekh's case, it was adjudged that . ..Congress might
entrust the final determination of these facts [upon which the alien's right
to land depend] to an executive officer, and that, if it did so, his order
was due process of law ....
The power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon
one foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same
reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same power.
The power of Congress, therefore, to expel, like the power to exclude
aliens ...may be exercised entirely through the executive officers; or
Congress may call in the aid of the judiciary to ascertain any contested
facts on which an alien's right to be in the country has been made by
Congress to depend.
Congress, having the right, as it may see fit, to expel aliens of a par-
ticular class, or to permit them to remain, has undoubtedly the right to
provide a system of registration and identification of the members of that
class within the country and to take all proper means to carry out the
system which it provides.
112
These five paragraphs demonstrate the basic reasoning employed to uphold
the act involved. First, the powers relating to foreign relations have been
delegated to the federal government, and immigration is regulated either by
treaties or by acts of Congress. Second, .the necessary fact finding can be
delegated to the administrative officers enforcing the immigration laws. Third,
as a part of this same power over immigration, the righi to remain under the
policies enunciated by Congress or treaty may likewise be conclusively deter-
mined by those officers. Finally, to effectuate this process, Congress can place
the burden on the resident alien to establish his right to remain.
Read abstractly, some of the above language has been interpreted as uphold-
ing the absolute substantive power to expel. In particular, the third paragraph.
is a favorite for supporting the "plenary" power of Congress over resident
aliens. Read in context, however, the language was concerned with the pro-
cedural propriety of entrusting determinations of fact in expulsion cases to
executive officers. The opinion may be said to recognize the plenary nature
of the power of Congress, but only within the proper scope of the exercise of
constitutionally delegated power.
3
Substantive limits to congressional power might have been involved in up-
112. 149 U.S. at 713-14.
113. 'Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 86-87 (1824) (relating to
interstate commerce) ; Veazie v. Moor, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 567, 573-74 (1852) (relating
to foreign commerce). See generally Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S.
320, 339-40 (1909).
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holding the system of registration, and indeed there was a brief attempt in
the opinion to show that the requirement of a white witness was reasonable."
4
But the majority concentrated instead on the undesirable nature of the aliens
before the Court. Thus, it was again stressed that Chinese residents were a
class by themselves that could not or would not assimilate.115 The ever-in-
creasing restriction upon their right to enter and remain in the United States
was outlined, and the opinion concluded, particularly in view of the decision
in Chae Chan Ping, that it was impossible to hold that petitioners had ac-
quired, either by treaty, international law, or previous decisions of the Su-
preme Court, any exemption from the power of Congress over aliens.116
-Whether the scope of congressional power over presumably nonassimilable
Chinese was considered broader than that of the power over other resident
aliens is not entirely certain.117 But the majority's citation of Chy Lung v.
Freeman,"8 a case holding the states preempted in the immigration field,
indicates that the source of congressional authority in the instant case was the
power over foreign commerce, and not inherent sovereignty.
Gray disposed of the contention that the removal of petitioners amounted
to banishment by arguing that it was "'but a method of enforcing the return
to his own country of an alien who has not complied with the conditions upon
the performance of which the government of the nation, acting within its
constitutional authority ... has determined that his continuing to reside here
shall depend."" 9 Thus, the power to terminate the residence of aliens here
was considered to rest upon conditional entry. But, the fact which disturbed
the entire Court was that petitioners had not violated any conditions imposed
at the time of their entrance, but only the terms of a subsequent act pre-
scribing the manner of proof of their lawful entry. Only after pages upon
pages discussing the shadowy concepts of inherent sovereignty and nonassimi-
lability does the majority opinion finally reach the validity of the statute it-
self, and, by regarding its racially based presumptions as within the power
to prescribe evidentiary rules, possible substantive issues were neatly a-
voided.
1 20
Thus, the significance of Fong Yue Ting is that Congress has the power
to eject resident aliens for conduct subsequent to entry. The conduct specifi-
cally involved was failure to meet the prescribed burden of proof of lawful
entry. The power to raise presumptions, including conclusive presumptions,
was subsequently extended to acts of substance (expellable acts) but Fong
Yue Ting did not, as seems to have been assumed in recent cases, abrogate
114. 149 U.S. at 729-30.
115. Id. at 717.
116. Id. at 716-24.
117. This question has been examined elsewhere and will not be pursued here. See
Boudin, The Settler Within Our Gates, 26 N.Y.U.L. R.av. 451, 455-74 (1951).
1,18. 92 U.S. 275 (1876), cited in 149 U.S. at 724.
119. Id. at 730.
120. Id. at 729.
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the need for Congress to find a rational nexus between proscribed conduct
and the regulation of immigration before declaring an act expellable.
In concluding, Mr. Justice Gray again made clear that the statute was up-
held as a valid exercise of constitutionally delegated congressional power.
121
With the repetition of such statements concerning the opinion's rationale, it
may seem surprising that it has been traditionally accepted as recognizing a
dual source of power, one (foreign commerce) constitutionally defined and the
other (sovereignty) extraconstitutional and undefinable. The reason, it is sug-
gested, lies in the dissenting opinions, which refused to dispose of the consti-
tutional status of lawful resident aliens by manipulating the manner of
proof.12 2 But while it does not follow that prescribing conditions upon the
right to remain was or is per se improper, it is nevertheless possible to agree
with Chief Justice Fuller that the majority opinion, ambiguous as it is "con-
tains within it the germs of the assertion of unlimited and arbitrary power,
in general, incompatible with the immutable principles of justice, inconsistent
with the nature of our government, and in conflict with the written Consti-
tution by which that government was created and those principles secured.'
' 2 3
121. "[T]he judicial department cannot properly express an opinion upon the wisdom
• . .of the measures enacted by Congress in the exercise of the powers confided to it
by the Constitution.. . ." 149 U.S. at 731.
122. See Boudin, supra note 117, at 462-64.
123. 149 U.S. at 764. It is beyond dispute that the opinions of Fong Ytw Ting tend
to mislead. The case could easily be understood to hold that resident aliens are, in effect,
temporary residents as a matter of law, unless they are eligible to and do become citizens.
The conclusion that Fong Yue Ting had been so interpreted by immigration officers is
almost irresistible from the facts in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649
(1898). Mr. Wong was born in the United States of parents who were non-diplomatic
residents. He had previously departed from the United States and returned in 1890, sub-
sequent to Cae Chan Ping but prior to Fong Yue Ting, and was admitted "upon the
sole ground that he was a native-born citizen of the United States .... [He] remained
in the United States .. .until the year 1894, when he again departed for China upon
a temporary visit, and with the intention of returning . . .and did return . . . in . ..
1895, and • . . [was denied admittance] upon the sole ground that . . . [he] was not a
citizen of the United States." Id. at 651. Thus, it was not until after Fong Yue Ting,
decided in 1893, that his citizenship was challenged. Previously, in Quock Ting v. United
States, 140 U.S. 417 (1891), a sixteen-year-old Chinese entrant had been denied admit-
tance solely on the ground that he failed to prove he was born in the United States.
The assumption of both the Court and the Government at that time was, apparently, that
a Chinese person born in the United States was a citizen. If it could be argued, however,
that Chinese residents were to be taken as part of Chinese expansionism, and were to be
considered as temporary residents, with no status or right to remain, it could be argued
further that the children of such residents, who could not become naturalized, should not
be considered within the meaning and intent of the constitutional definition of citizen-
ship in the fourteenth amendment. Thus, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, in his dissenting
opinion in 'Wong Kim Ark, apparently acquiescing in Fong Y1e Ting, concluded: "If
children born in the United States were deemed presumptively and generally citizens
[prior to the fourteenth amendment], this was not so when they were born of aliens
whose residence was merely temporary, either in fact, or in point of law." 169 U.S. at
729.
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Expulsion and the Power to Punish
Wong Wing v. United States 2 4 presented the question of the validity of
section 4 of the Act of May 5, 1892,125 which had been noted but not passed
on in Fong Yue Ting. 26 It provided "that any such Chinese . . .convicted
and adjudged to be not lawfully entitled to be or remain in the United States
shall be imprisoned at hard labor for a period of not exceeding one year and
thereafter removed from the United States, as hereinbefore provided."' 2 7
This provision was held unconstitutional since it prescribed a criminal sanc-
tion without observance of the constitutional procedural prerequisites.128 What
the opinion said in order to place this holding in context, however, is what
is of present interest.
In reviewing the earlier opinions, the opinion in Wong Wing first sum-
marized what had been stated in Fong Yue Ting.129 But further on in the
opinion, the dicta went further than Fong Yue Ting, stating that the Chinese
Exclusion Acts validly prescribed expulsion of both lawful and unlawful resi-
dents.130 That the question of the status of the lawfully admitted alien was
presented in Fong Yue Ting is true, but the case did not dispose of that
question, since the statute involved dealt only with the method of proof of
lawful entry. Thus, the majority opinion in Wong Wing appeared to adopt
the reading of Fong Yue Ting that had been so vigorously attacked by the
dissenters in the earlier case-as authority for plenary congressional power
over aliens. In a further restatement, however, this position was somewhat
modified:
No limits can be put by the courts upon the power of Congress to
protect, by summary methods, the country from the advent of aliens
whose race or habits render them undesirable as citizens, or to expel such
if they have already found their way into our land and unlawfully remain
therein.13
This is the beginning of the idea that those who, subsequent to entry, display
habits or characteristics which render them objectionable residents may be
expelled. But to concede such power does not, as will be seen, mean that it
is unlimited.
The Status of the Illegal Entrant
The only remaining pre-Harisiades immigration case which could be con-
sidered support for an inherent sovereignty basis of power over aliens, United
1.24. 163 U.S. 228 (1896).
125. Ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25.
126. 149 U.S. at 725-26.
127. Ch. 60, § 4, 27 Stat. 25.
128. 163 U.S. at 237.
129. Id. at 231.
130. Id. at 234-35. These acts remained a separate sphere of legislation until their
repeal by the Act of Dec. 17, 1943, ch. 344, 57 Stat. 600.
131. 163 U.S. at 237; cf. United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
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States ex rel. Turner v. Williams,=32 discloses upon analysis that no such
theory was actually endorsed. Turner was a philosophical anarchist, who
entered illegally for the purpose of a lecture tour. He was not seeking per-
manent residence, and was arrested only a few days after entrance. The case
involved, therefore, the status of a temporary illegal resident. His counsel,
however, attacked the proceedings upon the broad constitutional grounds that
the act violated the first, fifth, and sixth amendments, and that there was no
delegated power to exclude friendly aliens.'33 To these contentions Mr. Chief
Justice Fuller first replied, after restating the conditional entry theory of ex-
pulsion, that the expulsion of an illegal entrant is not a criminal proceed-
ing. 4 He then observed that, whether congressional power rested on inherent
sovereignty or on the power to regulate foreign commerce, the act before the
Court could not be invalidated. 135 This opinion must not be taken as an ac-
ceptance of a dual source of power over resident aliens; the Chief Justice was
one of the Fong Yue Ting dissenters. Here, he was merely arguing that,
whatever theory of power is adopted, the illegal entrant cannot object to his
ejection. In any event, since the short-term, illegal entrant may properly be
given the status of one at the border, the inherent sovereignty concept was as
relevant to Turner as it had been to Chae Chan Ping.136 Thus, Turner can-
not be legitimately interpreted as conceding to Congress unlimited power over
all resident aliens.
Executive Powers
Attention has thus far been focused on legislative power. But in recent years
confusion has arisen regarding the extent of executive power to regulate im-
migration. It is, therefore, essential to delineate the powers of the Executive
in this field with precision.
Delegation of Legislative Power
Power delegated to enforce congressional policies can be readily distin-
guished from original executive power. The issue contedted in Ekiu was
whether Congress could delegate fact finding powers to executive officers.
This delegation was upheld, and similar ones have repeatedly been sus-
tained.137 The numerous instances in which the Court has reminded enforce-
132. 194 U.S. 279 (1904).
133. Id. at 285-89.
134. Id. at 290.
135. Ibid.
136. "[U]nder [the Constitution] the power to exclude has been determined to exist,
[and] those who are excluded cannot assert the rights in general obtaining in a land to
which they do not belong as citizens or otherwise." Id. at 292.
137. E.g., Mahler v. Eby, 264 UiS. 32, 40 (1924); The Japanese Immigrant Case
(Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
As early as Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 834 ('No. 5126) (C.C.D. Pa. 1799), it
was observed in a charge to the jury: "If this power is proper, it must be exercised by
somebody. If from the nature of it, it could be exercised by so numerous a body as con-
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ment officers that they may not go beyond the policies enacted are adequate
evidence that executive power over aliens is ordinarily legislative in origin.13
The Treaty Power
The theory of direct executive power over immigration probably stems from
the cases which observed that the power to regulate immigration is vested in
the political (nonjudicial) branches of the Government, and may be exercised
by treaty as well as by act of Congress.13 9 Thus, besides exercising the power
delegated to it by Congress, the Executive may also determine immigration
policies to the extent that treaties are applicable.
But a treaty is not necessarily controlling, even on the points it covers.
While a later treaty prevails over a prior statute,140 and a subsequent statute
will be construed in conformity with prior treaty rights whenever possible, 41
a subsequent inconsistent statute prevails over a prior treaty, 142 and treaties
are, when possible, construed in conformity with general immigration laws.143
Obviously, aside from cases involving a treaty which affects a particular alien
or class of aliens, the treaty power cannot be relied upon to uphold the regu-
lation of immigration. Indeed, those who enter pursuant to rights granted by
some treaties are not classified as immigrants. 144 Thus, in dealing with a per-
manent resident admitted in accordance with the general immigration laws,
gress, yet as congress are not constantly sitting, it ought not to be exercised by them
alone. If they are not to exercise it, who so fit as the president? What interest can he
have in abusing such an authority ?"
138. See, e.g., Barber v. Gonzales, 347 U.S. 637 (1954) ; Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan,
333 U.S. 6 (1948); Kessler v. Strecker, 307 U.S. 22 (1939); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S.
32 (1924) ; Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3 (1915) ; Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
139. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953);
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 40 (1924) ; The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 100
(1903) ; Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902) ; Nishimura Ekiu v.
United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892). See also United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S.
213, 220 (1902).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 220 (1902) (dictum);
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) (dictum).
141. United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S. 459, 465 (1900); Lau Ow Bew v. United
States, 144 U.S. 47, 62 (1892).
142. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957) (dictum) ; Chae Chan Ping v. United
States, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889) ; Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238 (1889) ; Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888) ; Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S.
580 (1884).
143. See The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903).
144. Compare Cheung Sum Shee v. Nagle, 268 U.S. 336, 345 (1925) (holding that
"an alien entitled to enter the United States 'solely to carry on trade' under an existing
treaty of commerce and navigation is not an immigrant within the meaning of the [1924]
Act, § 3(6), and therefore is not absolutely excluded by § 13"), witl Chang Chan v.
Nagle, 268 U.S. 346, 351 (1925) (noting that "this cause involves no claim of right
granted or guaranteed by treaty").
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rather than as a foreign national relying on treaty rights, no general claim to
executive authority under the treaty power can be properly made.1 45
Foreign Relations
The existence of a nonreviewable executive power to control aliens, based
on the fact that foreign relations are involved, may also be suggested.14 The
role of the executive in immigration under the foreign relations power seems
limited to dealing with the protests of the alien's native country. Obviously,
the international consequences involved make immigration an area of executive
concern. But when no diplomatic question is directly involved, the executive
power in foreign relations seems irrelevant.
The modern theory of independent executive power seems directly trace-
able to United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.147 In overcoming the
contention that a joint resolution, which in effect authorized the President, in
his discretion, to declare the exportation of arms to certain countries a crimi-
nal act, was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the Court
stated that the rule that the federal government is one of limited, constitu-
tionally delegated powers applied only to internal matters. 48 While discuss-
ing the existence of extraconstitutional powers, Mr. Justice Sutherland stated:
"[T]he power to expel undesirable aliens .. .[exists] as inherently insepara-
ble from the conception of nationality .... [This] court ... found the war-
rant for its conclusion [in this area] not in the provisions of the Constitution,
but in the law of nations. 1 49 In support he cited Fong Yue Ting.
If the previous analysis of Fong Yue Ting is correct, then Mr. Justice
Sutherland's assertion that it predicated the power to expel on extraconstitu-
tional power is erroneous. 5 0 In any event, the context in which he cited Fong
Yue Ting shows that he did not intend to use the case in support of the prin-
ciple he was ultimately seeking to establish-executive power without any
constitutional basis. In the paragraph from which the preceding quotation is
taken, he was dealing with the powers of the federal government as a whole,
both legislative and executive.' 5 ' Only after identifying a separate category of
powers, which allegedly inhere to a nation irrespective of any constitutional
delegation, did Sutherland shift the focus of his opinion to his primary con-
cern, the source of executive powers.'
5 2
145. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 147 (1909). It is, of course, possible
that the Executive could make treaties which drastically affected the rights of resident
aliens. But the treaty itself would have to conform to constitutional standards. Cf. Reid
v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957).
146. Cf. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
147. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
148. Id. at 315-16.
149. Id. at 318.
150. See text at notes 95-123 supra.
151 See 299 U.S. at 315-16.
152. Id. at 319-20. The theory of inherent external powers presented in Curtiss-
Wright was a judicial expression of the same views Sutherland espoused in CoNsTnru-
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The only principle of legitimate significance to the field of immigration that
can be drawn from Curtiss-Wright, therefore, is that "the lack of a clause in
the Constitution specifically empowering such action has never been held to
render Congress impotent to deal as a sovereign with resident aliens.
'1 3
Nevertheless, in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy,154 the entire
rationale and theory of the opinion in Curtiss-Wright was applied in an ex-
clusion case.
[T]here is no question of inappropriate delegation of legislative power
involved here [under the 1941 Act, and the regulations enforcing it].
The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right
to do so stems not alone from the legislative power but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation. United States
v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.... ; Fong Yue Ting v. United States
.... When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the admissibility
of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. It is implement-
ing an inherent executive power.'x
Since Knauff involved exclusion, which has a direct bearing on foreign
relations, this statement may be justified, although neither Curtiss-Wright
nor Fong Yue Ting dictated the extension of the principles they announced
to the general regulation of aliens. If the statement is meant to apply only to
cases involving so-called emergency powers, 5 6 however, it need not be con-
tested on principle. But the danger in resting exclusion cases on a so-called
"inherent executive power" is that the theory might be transferred to cases
of expulsion.15
It is important to realize, therefore, that there is nothing in the cases other
than Knauff to justify a theory that the power to expel rests upon an inherent,
undefined executive power. Curtiss-Wright did not purport to extend the in-
herent sovereignty theory beyond that espoused in Fong Yue Ting. And, in
Harisiades, Fong Yue Ting was the sole judicial authority cited for the prop-
osition that the power to expel rested on sovereignty. 5 8
TIONAL POWER AND WORLD AFFAIRs (1919). Besides being based on unsupported historical
premises, it is logically contradictory. See McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power
in the United States, 42 MINN. L. REv. 709, 716-20 (1958).
153. Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) (citing Curtiss-Wright). This
view ignores the fact that power over immigration had long been associated with the
foreign commerce power. See Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580
(1884).
154. 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
155. Id. at 542.
156. Knauff involved the Act of June 21, 1941, ch. 210, 55 Stat. 252, and executive
regulations pursuant to it. These provisions t)f the act are now part of Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952, § 215, 66 Stat. 190, 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (1952).
157. Whenever a power to exclude has been found, the power to expel has followed
close behind. Compare Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), with Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893); and Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78
(1914).
158. Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.-S. 580, 587-88 (1952).
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Substantive Limits to the Power To Expel
Although the most recent case involving peacetime power over aliens that
has thus far been examined in any detail is over fifty years old, the supposed
support for the currently accepted theory of congressional power has been
fully considered. Immediately prior to Harisades, as a basis for the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952,1i9 Congress asserted:
The power of Congress to control immigration stems from the sover-
eign authority of the United States as a nation and from the constitu-
tional power of Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations.
Every sovereign nation has power, inherent in sovereignty and essential
to self-preservation, to forbid entrance of foreigners within its dominions,
or to admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may
see fit to prescribe. Congress may exclude aliens altogether or prescribe
terms and conditions upon which they may come into or remain in this
country.1 6
0
Basically, this view is predicated on, although a misapprehension of, three
cases: Chae Chan Ping, Ekiu, and Fong Yne Ting. Originally, as has been
seen, the power to regulate immigration was thought to be based on the for-
eign commerce 161 and treaty powers.162 And although the broad sweep of the
opinions in the three leading cases obscures the issue, 163 none of them relies
on sovereignty as the source of congressional authority.164 The use of the
commerce power to justify peacetime regulation of immigration is, moreover,
in accord with the analogous concept that carriage or movement of persons
across state boundaries constitutes interstate commerce..
6 5
But the more serious misconception expressed in the congressional expres-
sion of the basis of its power, however, is the apparent assumption that it
may unconditionally impose conditions: the belief that since the power to ex-
clude is absolute, the power to expel, which is implied from that power, must
necessarily be equally unlimited. This approach may have enjoyed spotty
acceptance in the last century, but constitutional thinking has evolved far be-
159. 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1952).
160. H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952). (Footnotes omitted.) See also
S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1950).
161. See, e.g., Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U4S. 580, 590-91, 595, and
cases cited 591-93 (1884). See also Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493, 494-95 (No.
4366) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823).
162. See cases cited note 139 supra.
163. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604 (1889); Fong Yue Ting
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711-12 (1893) ; Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142
U.S. 651, 659 (1892).
164. See text at notes 70-123 supra.
165. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 172 (1941) ; Covington & Cincinnati Bridge
Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U.S. 204, 213 (1894) ; Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114
U.S. 196, 203 (1885).
In a recent report, the State Department listed foreign commerce as the exclusive
basis of congressional power over immigration. CouLTER, VISA WORK OF THE DEPART-
MENT OF STATE AND THE FOREIGN SERVICE 28 (Dep't of State Pub. No. 6510, 1958).
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yond such a facile, algebraic approach to human rights.' 6 Furthermore, no
such theory was unequivocally accepted by the Supreme Court prior to Hari-
siades in immigration cases.
Since regulation of immigration is based on constitutionally delegated
powers-primarily the foreign commerce power in times of peace-substantive
limits to congressional authority in this field necessarily exist. In defining these
limits as they relate to the power to expel, an analogy to the regulation of
imports may be helpful. Indeed, import cases were relied upon to uphold ex-
ercise of both the power to exclude 167 and the power to eject 168 against pro-
cedural due process attacks. Imports cease to be such in the constitutional
sense when they are merged in the domestic economy.' 6 9 Arguably, immi-
grants should likewise cease to be considered "foreign products" upon being
lawfully admitted as and becoming permanent residents. 10 And by analogy
to the power to subject imports to further regulation after admittance, the
power to expel can be viewed not as an independent power, but merely as an
adjunct of the power to exclude.
17 '
Clearly, Congress may exclude those whose "habits or condition,"' 7 2 "race
or habits,"' 73 or "history, condition, or characteristics,"' 74 make them un-
desirable permanent residents. And when such an alien is mistakenly allowed
to enter, a subsequent removal is not objectionable, provided the ejection takes
166. 'See Boudin, supra note 117, at 649-50.
,Compare the treatment of the power of the states over foreign corporations in the
following cases: Atlantic Ref. Co. v. Virginia, 302 U.S. 22 (1937) (power to exclude
is absolute) ; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) (once corporation
is "domesticated," ad valorem taxes, at least, may not be discriminatory) ; Lincoln Nat'l
Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673 (1945) (reasonable conditions may be imposed
on foreign corporations at time of entry). One commentator has concluded that "the
power to evict a corporation from doing local business is not necessarily as broad as the
power to exclude. Therein seems to lie the real nub of the matter, although a reading of
most of the opinions . . .discloses no such conscious rationale of the cases." HARnT1AN,
STATE TAXATION OF INTERSTATE CommERcE 235 (1953).
167. Nishimura Ekiu v. United ,States, 142 U.S. 651, 660 (1892), relied on Hilton v.
Merritt, 110 U.S. 97 (1884) (summary procedures authorized in dealing with imports).
168. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912), relied on United States v. Zucker,
161 U.S. 475 (1896) (due process in proceedings to penalize improper importation of
goods).
169. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
170. Immigrants are defined as ones "who seek to enter the United States for per-
manent residence." H.R. REP. No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1952). To the same
effect, see S. REF. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 414 (1950). 'Apart from statutory defini-
tions, the word "immigrant" implies one who is seeking permanent residence. See Kar-
nuth v. United States ex rel. Albro, 279 U.S. 231, 242 (1929).
171. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893); cf. Rabang
v. Boyd, 353 U.S. 427, 432 (1957).
172. iSee The Japanese Immigrant Case, 189 U.S. 86, 97 (1903).
173. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
174. See Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 91 (1914).
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place within a reasonable time after entry, before a substantial change of
positibn, in human terms, has occurred.
175
Unlike those of imports, the undesirable characteristics of human beings,
with the questionable exception of race, are not easily identifiable. Proof of
initial excludability, therefore, is not an easy matter. As a consequence, it is
reasonable to prescribe that certain postentry conduct be taken as disclosing
excludable qualities or characteristics. That is, the alien's subsequent "charac-
ter and conduct... [may] determine the question of exclusion or removal."1 76
So viewed, expellable acts are merely substitutes for proof of initial exclud-
ability, and the power to eject is merely the power to effectuate a delayed
exclusion.
77
Thus, the alien's right to remain may be made to depend upon the per-
formance of certain conditions imposed at the time of entry.178 But these con-
ditions must reasonably relate to regulation of immigration of aliens, and not
to the furtherance of other policies not connected with the fact of their alien-
age. Absent such a relationship, expulsion can no longer be justified as a valid
regulatory measure. The implications of this view will be developed latw, but
for proper orientation extensive consideration of the cases between Fong Yue
Ting and Harisiades is first necessary.
The Keller Case and Substantive Due Process
Keller v. United States 179 is the second, and to date the last, case in which
the Court has held legislation ostensibly aimed at regulating immigration un-
constitutional. 80 Keller considered the validity of section 3 of the Act of Feb.
20, 1907, which prescribed criminal liability for harboring alien prostitutes
within three years of their entry.' 8 ' The defendants were citizens, who had
175. The bare fact of residence, however acquired, entitles an alien to procedural
due process. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)
(dictum).
176. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 148 (1.909).
177. For the distinction between postentry ejection statutes and ordinary statutes of
limitation upon the right of removal after an illegal or erroneous entry, see text at notes
230-54 infra.
It has been recommended that no expulsions be based on the postentry conduct of
aliens admitted for permanent residence. See CoRsI, PATHS TO THE NEw WORLD: AMERI-
CAN IMTMIGRATION-YEsTERDAY, TODAY AND To ioRRow 40 (1953); Maslow, Recasting
Our Deportation Law: Proposals for Reform, 56 CoLum. L. IRnv. 309, 324 (1956). As
a policy proposal this has much to recommend it, but it is not a proper view of the
legitimate exercise of constitutional power. Cf. Brolan v. United States, 236 UIS. 216,
219-20 (1915) (discussed note 186 infra).
178. See Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272 (1912); Pearson v. Williams, 202 U.S.
281, 284 (1906).
179. 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
180. The other was Wong Wing v. United States, 163 UTS. 228 (1896), which in-
volved the validity of imposing criminal sanctions without observing procedural safe-
guards.
181. Ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 899.
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purchased a brothel in which an alien woman of less than three years' residence
was an inmate. The evidence showed that defendants had not procured her
entry, and that they were unaware of when she had entered. 82 Counsel for
the defense argued that applying the prescribed criminal penalties to defend-
ants would violate the reserved police power of the states. 8 3 The Govern-
ment, on the other hand, sought to justify the act under the conceded con-
gressional power to regulate immigration.
8 4
Thus the issue before the Court was whether the provision in question was
sufficiently related to any power of the federal government to justify the in-
vasion of an area of state authority. Mr. Justice Brewer, writing for the ma-
jority, first determined that the statute could not be justified under the treaty
power,185 then turned to the foreign commerce power as a possible basis. On
the facts of the case, he concluded that there was no reasonable relation be-
tween the regulation of immigration and the conduct of the defendants which
the statute made criminal,8 6 and therefore, that this attempted application of
the power over immigration was unconstitutional.
8 7
In reaching this result, the majority expressly left open the question of the
extent of congressional power over resident aliens, 88 in significant contrast
to the modern position that consideration of this question is foreclosed by
Fong Yue Ting.
Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, felt that the legislation was a reasonable
exercise of the power over immigration. To support his position, he under-
took to define the limits of the power over resident aliens.'89 While he dis-
182. 213 U.S. at 147.
183. Id. at 140-41 (argument for plaintiff in error).
184. Id. at 141-43 (argument for defendant in error).
185. Id. at 147.
186. Id. at 147-48.
The meaning of Keller was placed beyond doubt in Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S.
216 (1915), a case involving the power of ,Congress to punish a conspiracy to import
opium, and a conspiracy to receive, conceal, and facilitate the transportation of opium
illegally imported. In holding the contention of lack of power frivolous, the Court dis-
tinguished Keller, stating that there "the act punished not the harboring of persons for
immoral purposes who had been brought into the United States in violation of the pro-
hibition against importation, but its provision also embraced the harboring of persons for
immoral purposes if they were aliens, even although [sic] they had come into the United
States lawfully." Id. at 221-22.
187. 213 U.S. at 147-49. Compare United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 488-89
(1948).
188. 213 U.S. at 144.
189. 213 U.S. at 149. Holmes relied on Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893).
Decided shortly after Fong Ye Ting, Lees upheld the penalty provisions of the Act of
Feb. 26, 1885, ch. 164, § 3, 23 Stat. 333, which provided for a forfeiture for every alien
brought into the country in violation of the Act, the Court stating:
[S]ince the Chinese Exchlcion Case [Chae Chan Ping] . . . and the case of
Fong Yaw Ting v. United States ... affirming fully the power of Congress over
the exclusion of aliens, there can be little doubt in the matter. Given in Congress
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sented from the holding that the legislation was unconstitutional as applied,
the views he expressed concerning the extent of the substantive power over
the resident alien may be taken to be those of the entire Court.190 Holmes'
ideas rest on the accepted meaning and purport of the conditional entry theory
of expulsion. Since his brief opinion in Bugajewitz v. Adams,191 decided four
years after Keller, is generally held to place any question of possible substan-
tive limits to the power to expel beyond debate, 192 the views set forth in
Keller must be quoted almost in their entirety to provide an understanding
of Holmes' true position.
For the purpose of excluding those who unlawfully enter this country
Congress has power to retain control over aliens long enough to make
sure of the facts . . . . To this end it -may make their admission con-
ditional for three years .... If the ground of exclusion is their calling,
practice of it within a short time after arrival is, or may be, made evi-
dence of what it was when they came in. Such retrospective presumptions
are not always contrary to experience or unknown to the law .... If a
woman were found living in a house of prostitution within a week of her
arrival, no one, I suppose, would doubt that it tended to show that she
was in the business when she arrived. But how far back such an inference
shall reach is a question of" degree like most of the questions of life.
And, while a period of three years seems to be long, I am not prepared
to say, against the judgment of Congress, that it is too long.
[I]t is fair to observe that the presumption... is not open to rebuttal.
I should be prepared to accept even that, however, in view of the diffi-
culty of proof in such cases. Statutes of which the justification must be
the same are familiar in the States .... It is true that . . . [ordinarily]
in such instances the legislature has power to change the substantive law
of crimes, and it has been thought that when it is said to create a con-
clusive presumption as to a really disputable fact, the proper mode of
stating what it does . . . is to say that it has changed the substantive
law .... This may be admitted without denying that considerations of
evidence are what lead to the change. And if it should be thought more
philosophical to express this law in substantive terms, I think that Con-
gress may require, as a condition of the right to remain, good behaviour
for a certain time, in matters deemed by it important to the public wel-
the absolute power to exclude aliens, it may exclude some and admit others, and
the reasons for its discrimination are not open to challenge in the courts. Given
the power to exclude, it has a right to make that exclusion effective by punishing
those who assist in introducing, or attempting to introduce, aliens in violation of
its prohibition.
150 U.S. at 480.
190. [Holmes' dissent in Keller] was not a dissent from anything that the majority
of the court had said in the case. On the contrary, it was the statement of the law
as it had been declared by the court in previous cases with respect to the con-
ditions upon which aliens are permitted to be and remain in this country, and upon
that subject unquestionably expressed the views of the whole court.
Looe Shee v. North, 170 Fed. 566, 571 (9th Cir. 1909).
191. 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
192. See text at notes 276-94 infra.
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fare and of a kind that indicates a preexisting habit that would have
excluded the party if it had been known .... 193
From this formulation of the theory of the power to expel, it becomes quite
clear why "the classes of aliens who are subject to deportation are not wholly
made up of those who enter in violation of the law; in some cases causes for
deportation may arise after lawful entry.
'194
The fact that an alien may enter lawfully, and yet remain unlawfully, does
not mean that there is unlimited power to expel. Obviously, one who is ad-
mitted for temporary purposes may overstay his lawful period of residence
and be ejected. Likewise, one whose conduct subsequent to a lawful entry
falls short of prescribed standards may be ejected. But to sanction such action
is not to concede unlimited power to banish. As Holmes' opinion indicates,
deportation for postentry acts is based on a conclusive presumption that the
alien was excludable at entry. Only by applying such a rationale can the de-
portation of resident aliens be justified as a regulation of immigration.10 1 It
would seem that when the alien is able to show that the presumption is in-
valid as applied to him, expulsion can no longer be thought of as a regulation
of immigration and must be considered a punishment for the proscribed act.190
Although drawing conclusions from dicta is frequently risky, it seems rea-
sonable to say that Holmes did not consider the power to expel the mirror
image of the power to exclude. If this had been his view, the entire examina-
tion of the theory of the statute as applied to aliens would have been unneces-
sary. His opinion is not a hasty, ill-considered dissent; on the contrary, it is
the most lucid expression of the Court's understanding of the conditional entry
theory of expulsion. To make Holmes the villain responsible for the present
view concerning the power of Congress over the resident alien, therefore,
misses the point of both opinions in Keller.1 97 Although Holmes' decision in
193. 213 U.S. at 149-50. Holmes' opinion was concurred in by Harlan and Moody, JJ.
On the validity of conclusive presumptions, compare Bailey v. Alabama, 211 U.S. 452
(1908), the only federal case cited 'by Holmes which has not already been discussed. It
involved an Alabama statute making it a crime to receive salary in advance under writ-
ten contract with the intent to defraud the prospective employer. The statute provided
that the failure to perform the services was prima facie evidence of the prohibited fraudu-
lent intent. The presumption was attacked as violating the thirteenth amendment, as a
device to reduce Negroes to a status of semiservitude. Holmes refused to pass on the
question of the validity of the presumption on the ground that at the trial the state might
prove its case independent of the statutory presumption. He noted, however, that: "It
may be, although presumptions of intent from somewhat remote subsequent conduct are
not unknown to the common law . . . that the amendment creates a presumption that
cannot be upheld." Id. at 454. The presumption was ultimately held invalid. Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911).
194. Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 303 (1914).
195. Compare Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 97-98 (1958) (dictum).
196. Compare the discussion of deportation under the war power, note 57 stepra.
197. 'See Comment, 20 U. CI. L. Rav. 547, 550-51 (1953) (Holmes' dissent based
on view that power over aliens is absolute). The significance of the interpretation of the
conditional entry theory advanced here was also missed by Bullitt, who characterized it
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Bugajewitz is currently accepted as upholding the power to banish, his dis-
sent in Keller shows that Bugaiewitz is being interpreted incorrectly. Further-
more, the Keller dissent contains the germ of a substantive due process theory
that would strike down claims to unlimited power to banish long-term resident
aliens.
Sources of Power-A Summary
From the first consideration of the question, the power to regulate immi-
gration has been held to be part of the delegated powers of the federal gov-
ernment. Nevertheless, inherent sovereignty has come to be considered as a
second basis of power. The doctrine of inherent sovereignty as applied to
immigration originated as an answer to the assertion that the Government
could not, under international law, deprive Chinese laborers of their treaty
rights to return to or remain in the United States, but it is now invoked in
nearly all cases involving alien regulation. Given that the necessary sovereign
powers have been delegated to the federal government, however, it would seem
fairly clear that to urge a dual basis for governmental action, when a single
expressly delegated power is sufficient to support it, is not only misleading
but redundant. Unfortunately, the Court tends to talk of sovereignty when-
ever presented with a flesh-and-blood exclusion or expulsion, relying solely
on the foreign commerce power only when congressional power over immi-
gration is less dramatically exercised. 198 And although in theory, even sover-
eign powers are not constitutionally unlimited, 19 9 uncritical espousal of the
inherent sovereignty doctrine has submerged the question of possible substan-
tive limits.
EJECTION OF T]aE RESIDENT ALIEN
Legal doctrines are not self-generated abstract categories. They do
not fall from the sky; nor are they pulled out of it. They have a
specific juridical origin and etiology. They derive meaning and con-
tent from the circumstances that gave rise to them and from the pur-
poses they were designed to serve. To these they are bound as is a
live tree to its roots. . . . They cannot be wrenched from it and
mechanically transplanted into an alien, unrelated context without
suffering mutilation or distortion.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter 200
as a theory of an "implied contract between the immigrant and the natives whose an-
cestors preceded him to this country ... [which] smacks of indentured servitude ......
Bullitt, Deportation as a Denial of Substantive Due Process, 28 WAsH. L. REv. 205, 217
n.62 (1953).
198. Compare Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952), with Edye v. Robert-
son (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 591 (1884).
199. 'See United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649 (1898). Although the court
stated that "it is the inherent right of every independent nation to determine for itself,
and according to its own Constitution and laws, what classes of persons shall be entitled
to its citizenship," id. at 668, it rejected an asserted exercise of this inherent right by
the executive branch of the Government, when the exercise was inconsistent with the
constitutional limits of the power arising from the constitutional definition of citizenship.
200. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 50 (1957) (concurring opinion).
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Introduction
From the preceding analysis, it can be seen that Harisiades was not fully
supported by earlier cases. Admittedly, it is easy to misapprehend the sweep-
ing language of Fong Yue Ting when it is divorced from the legislation and
constitutional contentions involved. The subsequent disregard of Keller may
be explained by the facts that the defendants in that case were citizens and
the substantive limitations on federal action invoked stemmed from the powers
constitutionally reserved to the states. Thus Keller was not the sort of prec-
edent likely to be cited by counsel in cases involving the rights of resident
aliens, although its insistence upon a rational nexus between regulations
promulgated under the immigration powers and immigration itself is appli-
cable to such cases. Perhaps a more important reason why the Keller opinions
have been ignored, however, is the opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes four years
later in Bugajewitz, which is commonly construed as settling the constitutional
status of all resident aliens. A proper understanding of Bugajewitz is im-
possible without first considering the various types of resident aliens and the
purpose and intent of the legislation involved in the case.
Types of Resident Aliens
Four types of resident aliens should be distinguished: the temporary, the
illegal, the erroneously admitted, and the properly admitted permanent resi-
dent. The temporary resident is clearly not entitled to remain permanently,
unless he achieves an adjustment of status. 201 The illegal entrant is in the
same constitutional position as the alien seeking admittance. 20 2 At least where
he is apprehended shortly after entrance, his deportation may be considered
an exclusion.
2 0 3
The erroneously admitted alien, on the other hand, presents different prob-
lems. If allowed to enter after following all prescribed procedures, he cannot
be considered to be illegally within the country unless entry was obtained by
fraud. Nevertheless, when his characteristics are such as to have made him
excludable had the facts been known, subsequent ejection is proper as a
legitimate means of effectuating exclusion.
But the properly admitted permanent resident, who achieves admittance
neither erroneously nor by fraud, must be sharply distinguished from aliens
in the other categories. This distinction is sometimes difficult since the errone-
ous nature of entry is now generally determined from postentry conduct. It
is possible, therefore, to confuse the last two types of residents described un-
less the need for a causal connection between the proscribed postentry conduct
201. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 101(a) (15), 66 Stat. 167, 8
U.S.C. § 1101 (a) (15) (1952).
202. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 289-90 (1904).
203. For statutes referring to ejection of aliens as "removal," see Act of May 6, 1882,
ch. 126, § 12, 22 Stat 61; Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, § 12, 23 Stat. 117; Act of Sept.
13, 1888, ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 479; Act of May 3, 1892, ch. 60, § 2, 27 Stat. 25.
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and preentry characteristics is kept clearly in mind. For example, practicing
prostitution within a week of entry, to adopt Holmes' illustration, is a post-
entry act clearly supporting a presumption of initial excludability. When a
young woman becomes a prostitute twenty years after her entry as an infant
such a presumption becomes irrational. In the latter case, the woman is a
properly admitted permanent resident; her antisocial or undesirable conduct
is the exclusive product of our society and has nothing to do with her foreign
birth.
Using the foregoing distinctions it can be shown that the cases which are
currently accepted as upholding the power to banish long-term lawful resi-
dents were concerned with the entirely different problems raised by other
types of resident aliens.
Types of Expulsion Statutes
As an aid to understanding the legislation dealing with the four classes of
resident aliens, the corresponding types of expulsion statutes should be noted.
A Senate report has classified them as follows:
1. Violation of status or terms of conditional entry. This includes all
of the non-immigrant categories as well as the student who is designated
as a non-quota immigrant ....
2. Entering without inspection or by fraud.
3. Causes existing at time of entry. This includes aliens excluded by
emergency or wartime restrictions, aliens with fraudulent or no docu-
ments, aliens convicted or admitting the commission, prior to entry, of a
crime involving moral turpitude, immoral aliens, anarchistic or other sub-
versive aliens, and aliens with mental, physical, economic, or educational
disqualifications.
4. Causes arising after entry. This includes alien smugglers of aliens,
aliens convicted of crime, immoral aliens, anarchistic or other subversive
aliens, and aliens becoming public charges.
20 4
Type I involves temporary residents, or aliens admitted pursuant to treaty
status. Type II covers illegal residents. Type III involves erroneously ad-
mitted residents. Type IV, on the other hand, may apply to either erroneous-
ly admitted or properly admitted residents. Thus, serious substantive due
process questions arise only in connection with Type IV legislation.
Development of the Conditional Entry Theory
Viewing immigration legislation retrospectively, a growing recognition of
the distinction between illegal entrants and erroneously admitted residents can
be discerned. Prior to 1903, however, most legislation dealt with "unlawful"
residents, a phrase which could, textually at least, be construed to apply to
both types. This legislation included both the general immigration laws and
the Chinese Exclusion Acts, both of which will now be analyzed.
204. S. REP. No. 1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1950).
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The Chinese E.xclusion Acts
The Act of May 6, 1882, began the exclusion of Chinese laborers, provid-
ing:
That from and after the expiration of ninety days after the passage of
this act ... the coming of Chinese laborers to the United States be, and
... is hereby, suspended; and during such suspension it shall not be
lawful for any Chinese laborer to come, or, having so come after the ex-
piration of said ninety days, to remain within the United States.0 9
It also prohibited the landing of any persons "in violation of law,"' 200 and
further provided "that ...any Chinese person found unlawfully within the
United States shall be . . .removed . . .after being ... [so] found."
20 7
These provisions were carried forward in the Acts of July 5, 1884,208 and
Sept. 13, 1888.209 Less than a month later, the Act of Oct. 1, 1888, prohibited
Chinese laborers who had formerly been lawful residents "to return to, or
remain in, the United States.
'210
Read abstractly, the repeated references to those not entitled to "remain"
within the United States might be construed as referring to postentry causes
for expulsion. But it is clear from the relation of the expulsion clauses to the
exclusion provisions that only those who entered or reentered illegally could
be ejected.
In spite of the provision for the ejection of illegally resident Chinese, the
exclusion program did not prove effective. The Act of May 5, 1892,11 there-
fore, approached the problem in a new way. It continued the earlier ejection
provisions but, since it had proved difficult to determine who were and who
were not entitled to be or remain in the United States, section 6 established
what amounted to a conclusive presumption of unlawful entry for failure to
obtain a certificate of residence.212 Congress thus shifted the burden of proof
of lawful entry to the Chinese laborer. This was first upheld in Fong Yue
205. Ch. 126, § 1, 22 Stat. 59. The Act of Feb. 19, 1862, ch. 27, 12 Stat. 340, was
enacted to prohibit involuntary transportation of Chinese "coolie" laborers into the United
States. The act did not apply to voluntary immigrants.
206. Ch. 126, § 9, 22 Stat. 60.
207. Ch. 126, § 12, 22 Stat. 61.
208. Ch. 220, § 12, 23 Stat. 115.
209. Ch. 1015, § 13, 25 Stat. 479. This act impliedly recognized a distinction between
laborers intending to remain and others; it provided that "no Chinese laborer ... shall
be permitted to return to the United States unless he has a lawful wife, child, or parent
in the United States, or property therein of the value of one thousand dollars, or debts
of like amount due him and pending settlement ... ." Ch. 1015, § 6, 25 Stat. 477.
210. Ch. 1064, 25 Stat. 504, upheld in Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese
Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). See also Wan Shing v. United States, 140 U.S.
424, 426 (1891) (method of proof of right to reenter by one claiming to be a merchant).
21.1. Ch. 60, 27 Stat. 25.
212. Ch. 60, § 6, 27 Stat. 25.
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Ting v. United States..2 13 Later, on slightly different facts, it was again up-
held in Li Sing v. United States.
214
The General Immigration Acts
Except for the Alien Act of 1798,215 the first general statute to regulate
immigration was the Act of March 3, 1875,216 which excluded convicts and
213. 149 U.S. 698 (1893). In 1893, Congress amended § 6 of the 1892 act, so that the
right to remain had to be established "by at least one credible witness other than Chi-
nese," Act of Nov. 3, 1893, ch. 14, 28 Stat. 7, rather than "one credible white witness."
214. 180 U.S. 486 (1901). Occasionally relied on to support broad powers to expel,
see, e.g., Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296, 302 (1902), Li Sing involved
a resident alien who returned to China and subsequently obtained reentry into the United
States with a certificate purporting to establish that he was a merchant before leaving
this country. Confronted by evidence that he was a laborer, and had been one for a num-
ber of years prior to his departure, he failed to prove by non-Chinese witnesses that this
was not in fact true. His certificate was not conclusive under the terms of the Act of
July 5, 1884, ch. 20, 23 Stat. 115-16. His counsel's argument that placing the burden of
proof of lawful reentry on a resident was improper was rejected on the authority of Fong
Yttw Ting. 180 U.S. at 493. Since, on its facts, Li Sing involved a Type II or III ejec-
tion, the broad statement that "[T]he United States can forbid aliens from coming with-
in their borders, and can expel them from the country. .. .", id. at 495, can be taken to
mean merely that those who were excludable at entry can be ejected. Li Sing is also
confirmation that the significance of Fong Yue Ting was its approval of the shift in the
burden of proof. The last variation of any significance with respect to exclusion and the
removal of Chinese laborers was the Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 28 Stat. 390, which,
"to prevent unlawful entry of Chinese into the United States," provided that "in every
case where an alien is excluded from admission under any law or treaty now existing
or hereafter made, the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers, if ad-
verse to the admission of such alien, shall be final, unless reversed on appeal to the
Secretary of the Treasury." The validity of this act was upheld in Lem Moon Sing v.
United States, 158 U.S. 538, 549 (1895). Although the exclusion there was approved,
Mr. Justice Harlan's views on the constitutional status of the resident alien offer a signifi-
cant contrast to modern theory:
His [the alien's] personal rights when he is in this country . . . are as fully
protected by the supreme law of the land as if he were a native or naturalized
citizen of the United States. But when he has voluntarily gone from the country,
and is beyond its jurisdiction, being an alien, he cannot re-enter the United States,
in violation of the will of the government as expressed in enactments of the law-
making power.
Id. at 547-48.
Another Chinese exclusion case which has become precedent for banishment, Fok Yung
Yo v. United States, 185 U.S. 296 (1902), involved only the power to prohibit, by ad-
ministrative regulations, the right of transit through the United States, in an effort to
enforce the power to exclude and to prevent illegal entry.
All three of the cases discussed here were relied on to support broad expulsion powers
in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 587 n.1.1 (1952).
215. Ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570.
216. Ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477.
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prostitutes. 217 Containing no postentry ejection clauses, the act provided only
for deportation after exclusion.218 This method of enforcement was again
employed in the Act of Aug. 3, 1882,219 which added idiots, lunatics, and
persons likely to become public charges to the excludable classes, and in the
Act of Feb. 23, 1887,220 covering contract laborers. Such provisions have been
carried forward through all subsequent enactments, and are now, in varied
language, part of the 1952 act.
2 2 1
The Act of March 3, 1891,222 added further to the expanding excludable
classes, 223 but, more important, introduced ejection to the general immigra-
tion laws. Section 11 of the act provided in part "that any alien who shall
come into the United States in violation of law may be returned as by law
provided, at any time within one year thereafter .... -224 Insofar as this
applied to illegal entrants, it was a Type II provision. If the phrase "in vio-
lation of law" is taken to include "erroneously," however, it was also Type
III. In either case, however, the last words quoted were in the nature of a
statute of limitations.
The Act of March 3, 1903,22" altered the provisions respecting postentry
removal. Section 21 stated that those who entered illegally could be deported
within three years of entry,220 while section 20 provided for the ejection with-
in two years of entry of aliens whose preentry characteristics made them in-
eligible to enter.22 7 In both cases the statute of limitations approach was re-
tained.
With regard to the illegal entrant, the Act of Feb. 20, 1907,228 carried for-
217. Ch. 141, §§ 3, 5, 18 Stat. 477. It is worth noting that these original excludable
classes remain among the principal classes involved in Type IV expulsions.
218. Ch. 141, § 5, 18 Stat. 477.
219. Ch. 376, § 4, 22 Stat. 214.
220. Ch. 220, § 8, 24 Stat. 415.
221. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 237(a), 66 Stat 201, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a) (1952).
222. Ch. 551, 26 Stat. 1084.
223. For example, paupers, persons suffering from loathsome or dangerous contagious
diseases, and persons assisted by others to come..Ch. 551., § 1, 26 Stat. 1084. It also added
the public charge provision upheld in Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651
(1892).
224. Ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1086.
225. Ch. 1012, 32 Stat. 1213. This act added to the excludable classes epileptics, per-
sons insane within five years, or who had had two or more attacks of insanity, profes-
sional beggars, anarchists, persons who believed in or advocated the overthrow, by force
and violence, of the government, or of all governments or forms of law, or the assassina-
tion of public officials, and procurers.
226. Ch. 1012, § 21, 32 Stat. 1218.
227. Ch. 1012, § 20, 32 Stat. 1218. See the interpretation of this clause in S. REP. No.
1515, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1950).
228. Ch. 1.134, 34 Stat. 898. This act added to the excludable classes imbeciles, feeble-
minded persons, persons with physical or mental defects which may affect their ability
to earn a living, persons afflicted with tuberculosis, children unaccompanied by their
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ward the relevant provisions of the 1903 act with slight modifications, retain-
ing the three-year limitation.229 But the 1907 act's treatment of the errone-
ously admitted alien marked a new departure which can best be appreciated
by focusing on legislation dealing with that particular class.
The Erroneously Admitted Alien
The provisions thus far examined either prescribed ejection of unlawful
Chinese residents at any time, or ejection of general immigrants within a
limited period of time. Statutes containing limitation periods dealing particu-
larly with erroneously admitted residents were also adopted as part of the
general immigration laws. Thus, the Act of Oct. 19, 1888,230 dealing with
contract laborers who had been allowed to enter, amended the 1885 and 1887
acts:
To authorize the Secretary of the Treasury, in case he shall be satisfied
that an immigrant has been allowed to land contrary to the prohibition
of that law, to cause such immigrant within the period of one year after
landing or entry, to be taken into custody and returned to the country
from whence he came .... 231
This Type III provision is the first clear legislative recognition of the errone-
ously admitted alien. Similar clauses of widening applicability were included
in subsequent acts.2 3 2 The 1907 act provided for deportation of erroneously
admitted aliens within three years of their entry.
23 3
Of greater significance to the modem law of expulsion was the develop-
ment of presumptions of erroneous admittance, which made postentry acts
proof of the preentry character or conditions upon which removal was predi-
cated. This type of provision has evolved into the modern "expellable acts."
The first statute to make postentry conduct grounds for removal did not
adopt the presumption approach. Section 11 of the Act of March 3, 1891,
provided in part "that. . . any alien who becomes a public charge within one
year after his arrival . .. from causes existing prior to his landing therein
shall be deemed to have come in violation of law and shall be returned as
aforesaid."2 34 The requirement of a causal relationship between the preentry
parents, persons who admit commission of a crime involving moral turpitude, and women
coming for immoral purposes. Ch. 1134, § 2, 34 Stat. 898.
229. The protection given the resident alien by the "statute of limitations" theory was
somewhat curtailed by later holdings that, by omitting the word "immigrant" from the
1903 to 1907 acts, Congress had expressed an intent to exclude all entering aliens "irre-
spective of any qualification arising out of a previous residence or domicil in this coun-
try." Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 86-91 (1914); accord, Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S.
291, 296-97 (1914).
230. Ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 565.
231. Ch. 1210, 25 Stat. 566.
232. See Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, §§ 1, 10, 11, 26 Stat. 1084; Act of March 3,
1903, ch. 1012, § 20, 32 Stat. 1213.
233. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 20, 34 Stat. 904.
234. Ch. 551, § 11, 26 Stat. 1086.
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condition and the postentry conduct is quite clear. The burden of proving this
causal connection was placed upon the Government.
235
The Fong Yue Ting Court had, however, upheld the power of Congress to
place the burden of proof of lawful entry upon the alien. In Li Sing v. United
States,238 this shift of the burden had again been approved, this time with
respect to conduct both prior and subsequent to entry.23 7 From this point,
only a short step was required to make postentry conduct alone conclusive
evidence of erroneous or unlawful admittance. This step was taken in the Act
of Feb. 20, 1907.238
Since the exclusion act of 1875, the importing of alien prostitutes had been
a crime.23 9 The 1907 act made two substantial changes. The act made it a
crime to keep an alien prostitute in a house of ill fame within three years of
her entry ;240 and it further provided:
That . . . any alien woman or girl who shall be found an inmate of a
house of prostitution or practicing prostitution, at any time within three
years after she shall have entered the United States, shall be deemed to
be unlawfully within the United States and shall be deported as provided
by sections twenty and twenty-one of this Act.
24 1
That this provision was intended merely as a substitute for proof of initial
excludability is evident from the fact that alien prostitutes had been excluded
since 1875,242 while those who entered either illegally or erroneously were
deportable within three years under other sections of the 1907 act.
2 43
In addition to the provision just discussed, the 1907 act established a Joint
Congressional Commission on Immigration to make a "full inquiry, exami-
235. The burden was removed by the Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 1.9, 39 Stat. 890.
Congressional intent is clear from the following:
The existing law authorizes the deportation of any alien who becomes a public
charge, within the specified time limit, from causes existing prior to entry....
[This is to be changed so that it reads] "[F]rom causes not affirmatively shown
to have arisen subsequent to landing." . . . Many cases arise in which it is prac-
tically impossible for the Government to carry the burden imposed upon it as the
existing law is worded ....
S. R P. No. 352, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1916).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, § 241(a) (8), 66 Stat. 206, 8 U.S.C. § 1251
(a) (8) (1952), provides for the expulsion of any alien who, "in the opinion of the 'At-
torney General, has within five years after entry become a public charge from causes
not affirmatively shown to have arisen after entry."
236. 180 U.S. 486 (1901).
237. See note 214 supra.
238. Ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 900.
239. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 3, 18 Stat. 477.
240. Ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 899. This part of § 3 was held unconstitutional in Keller
v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
241. Ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 899-900.
242. See text at notes 215-21 supra.
243. Ch. 1134, §§ 20, 21, 34 Stat. 904-05.
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nation and investigation. '244 One of the principal objects of investigation was
prostitution, which the Commission's report characterized as "the most pitiful
and the most revolting phase of the immigration question. '245 Concerning
Keller, which had held unconstitutional the 1907 act's attempt to make "har-
boring" an alien prostitute a crime, the Commission observed:
The number of deportations is much smaller than that of arrests, because
the effectiveness of the law . . . has been very greatly lessened by the
decision . . Naturally it is much more difficult to weave a chain of
evidence about an importer or procurer than to convict a person of
"harboring. "243
It noted further that "it is often extremely difficult to prove the illegal en-
trance of either women or procurers," 247 and that the woman "is invariably
warned of the danger of deportation and instructed what lies [about the time
of entry] to tell if she is arrested in order to avoid deportation."
248
The Commission's recommendations 249 led to the 1910 amendments to the
1907 act.25 0 These added to the excludable classes persons who are supported
by or receive proceeds of prostitution,2 '1 overcame the specific constitutional
objections raised in Keller,26 and, in view of the then existing inability to
244. Ch. 1134, § 39, 34 Stat. 909.
245. S. Doc. No. 747, 61st Cong., 3d Sess., vol. 2, at 327 (1,910). This is the abstract
of the Commission's findings and conclusions and is the most concise and well organized
version of its views. The same material is also found in its preliminary (S. Doc. No.
196, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. (1909)) and final (S. Doc. No. 753, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. 53-124
(1910)) reports on the white slave question.
246. S. Doc. No. 747, supra note 245, vol. 2, at 331.
247. Id. vol. 2, at 339.
248. Id. vol. 2, at 341. The Commission conducted a study between November 15,
1908, and March 15, 1.909, of "alien women convicted in the night court of the city of
New York of soliciting on the streets and of being inmates of disorderly houses," id. vol.
2, at 332, in an attempt to ascertain the dates of their entry into the United States. The
study showed that less than 5% of the 581 women questioned admitted arriving within
three years. From this, the Commission deduced that widespread knowledge of the ex-
pulsion law had led to continual evasion. Id. vol. 2, at 333.
249. These included:
1. That section 3 of the immigration act of February 20, 1907, be amended by
removing the limitation of three years after the date of landing within which the
prostitute or procurer must be found.
Comncnt.-The evils of the traffic are ordinarily not lessened with the length
of time the criminal or prostitute remains in the country.
4. The burden of proof regarding the date and place of landing should be placed
upon the alien, if those facts are needed.
S. Doc. No. 196, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1909).
250. Act of March 26, 1910, ch. 128, 36 Stat. 263; see S. Doc. No. 747, supra note
245, vol. 2, at 327, 577.
251. Ch. 128, § 1, 36 Stat. 263.
252. The relevant portion of the section of the 1907 act was amended to read:
"[W]hoever shall keep, maintain, control, support, employ, or harbor in any house or
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prove time of entry,253 as well as the apparent conspiracy of the underworld
to avoid expulsion by lying about the critical date, eliminated the three-year
limitation period within which the conclusive presumption of initial exclud-
ability had formerly operated.
254
Prior to the 1917 act, then, the only ejection provisions which had no
limitation period were those dealing with erroneously admitted procurers and
prostitutes, who frustrated proof of the time of their entry, and those dealing
with Chinese laborers, who were presumed to be nonassimilable, and who, in
any event, had been allowed to enter or remain as foreign nationals pursuant
to treaties with China, and not as potential citizens.
The Significance of Bugajewitz
Pre-Bugajewitz cases. The constitutionality of the provisions of the 1907
act dealing with prostitutes was swiftly established. In Low Wah Svey v.
Backus,255 the first case under these provisions presenting a constitutional
issue, the prostitute involved was the wife off a citizen. Counsel for the hus-
band, who was the petitioner in the case, argued that the woman's marriage
to a citizen placed her outside the intent of the act, and that she had been
denied procedural due process. 256 Thus, the question of substantive limits to
the power to expel was not before the Court.
After considering in detail the procedural objections raised, the Court con-
cluded that since petitioner's wife, being a Chinese, was not entitled to become
a citizen even though married to one, she could be ejected under the statute.
As the Court interpreted the act:
other place, for the purpose of prostitution or for any other immoral purpose, in pursuance
of such illegal importation, any alien ... ." Ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 264. (Emphasis added.)
Section 3 of the 1907 act, as amended by § 2 of the 1910 act, provided that aliens con-
victed of the crimes enumerated in § 3 were to be deported after serving their sentences.
Ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 265. Although this provision appears to be somewhat similar to the
modern concept of deportable acts, the act can be interpreted merely as raising a con-
clusive presumption of initial excludability based on the evidence provided by the con-
viction. Admittedly, the legislative history, although far from conclusive, gives some in-
dication that Congress intended to deport alien procurers regardless of time of entry. See
H.R. REP. No. 44, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 1. (1909) ; S. Doc. No. 196, supra note 249, at
36. But under the theory existing at that time of the extent of power over aliens, such
an intent might well have been unconstitutional. See Keller v. United States, 213 U.S.
138, 149 (1909) (dissenting opinion). Thus the suggested interpretation of the statute
might have been adopted to save its constitutionality had it been tested. Compare Hawker
v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 196 (1898).
253. Only since the Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 1, 34 Stat. 596, which established
the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, have immigration stations kept records
of entries. Under present regulations, aliens who establish entry prior to June 30, 1906,
are presumed to have been admitted lawfully. 8 C.F.R. § 4.2(a) (1958).
254. Ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 265.
255. 225 U.S. 460 (1912). The 1910 amendments were already in force. The woman
had been arrested within three years of entry, however, and the Government and the
Court both assumed that the three-year limitation period of the 1907 act still applied.
256. 225 U.S. at 469-74.
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It was the manifest purpose of Congress ... to prevent the introduction
and keeping in the United States of women of the prohibited class. The
object of the act was to exclude alien prostitutes, or, if they entered and
were found violating the statute within the period prescribed, to return
them to the country whence they came.2 57
This interpretation of the statute is clearly consistent with the position taken
in the Keller dissent. Thus, while Low Wah Suey recognized that one may
be deprived of the right to remain solely because of acts subsequent to entry,
it must be remembered that the statute involved raised a conclusive presump-
tion of erroneous entry from those acts.
In Zakonaite v. Wolf, 258 which was decided shortly after Low Wah Suey,
counsel for Zakonaite contended that she had been denied procedural due
process, and, in an effort to come within the rule of Keller, argued in sub-
stance that:
The provisions of the immigration act in question, vesting in the Federal
authorities the power to try an immigrant, lawfully admitted into the
United States, for violation of the penal laws of the state of which he has
become a resident, constitute an interference with the police powers,
which are matters reserved for regulation by the states, and not within
any powers delegated to Congress by the Constitution.
2 5 9
Although this argument was dismissed without discussion,260 the Court's
action should not be interpreted as an acceptance of the theory that there are
no substantive limits on the power to expel. In disposing of the procedural
due process issue, the Court made clear that it regarded the case not as a
criminal prosecution, but as a proceeding to enforce a regulation imposed on
immigration.20 1 Since Zakonaite was unquestionably a prostitute at the time
of the proceedings and introduced no evidence that she had not been one at
time of entry, the regulation as applied to her was reasonably related to the
permissible congressional policy of excluding alien prostitutes. And, since the
regulation here was reasonably related to congressional power, it was irrele-
vant that the proscribed conduct might also involve the police power of the
states.20 2 Thus, the Court's summary dismissal of the argument based on
Keller was completely justified, and Zakonaite cannot be read as extending
congressional power over resident aliens beyond the limits conceded in
Holmes' earlier dissent.
A third case, Tiaco v. Forbes,2 3 decided one week before Bugajewitz, has
occasionally been cited for the proposition that the expulsion power is con-
257. 225 U.S. at 475-76.
258. 226 U.S. 272 (1912).
259. Brief for Appellant, 57 L. Ed. 219.
260. 226 U.S. at 275.
261. Ibid.
262. Compare Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
263. 228 U.S. 549 (1913).
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stitutionally unlimited. 26 The issue in Tiaco was whether the Governor Gen-
eral of the Philippines could be held liable for damages to Chinese aliens
whom he had deported, following a request from the Chinese government, as
dangerous to public tranquility. Counsel for the plaintiffs, conceding the ques-
tion of the extent of congressional power to expel aliens, argued that this
power had not been delegated to the Philippine government.2 16 It is clear,
then, that no question of substantive limits to the power to expel was before
the Court.
It is interesting to note that Mr. Felix Frankfurter, in his brief for the
Philippines, argued that "the expulsion of dangerous persons where the cause
of danger arose subsequent to entry into the country has never been a subject
of Federal regulation.
'266
From this, he concluded that the states were free to exclude or expel, an
assertion which would be highly debatable today.207 The vital point, however,
is that only two days after Bugajewitz was submitted, Frankfurter stressed
that no federal legislation had as yet prescribed ejection for postentry charac-
teristics or conditions. If he was right, then Bugajewitz could not possibly
have settled the question of the existence of the power to banish for postentry
acts, since the statutes before the Court in that case did not assert such a
power.
To return to Tiaco, Holmes' language was very broad: "It is admitted that
sovereign states have inherent power to deport aliens, and seemingly that
Congress is not deprived of this power by the Constitution of the United
States. '268 But his citations of Fong Yue Ting, Wong Wing, Turner, and
Fok Yung Yo v. United States, 269 none of which upheld unlimited power to
expel, show that he intended to break no new ground but merely to affirm
constitutional recognition of the power, whatever its limits. On the main point
contested by plaintiffs, he concluded that:
As Congress is not prevented by the Constitution, the Philippine Gov-
ernment cannot be prevented by the Philippine Bill of Rights alone ....
Deporting the plaintiffs was not depriving them of due process of law,
unless on other grounds the local government was acting beyond its
power.
270
264. See Ex parte Bridges, 49 F. Supp. 292, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
265. 228 U.S. at 552.
266. Brief for Defendants in Error, 57 L. Ed. 963.
267. See Note, Wetbacks: Can the States Act to Curb Illegal Entryf, 6 STAN. L.
Rxv. 287 (1954).
The authorities cited to support Mr. Frankfurter's conclusion dealt with health and
quarantine laws. Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Board of Health, 186
U.S. 380, 391 (1902) ; Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900) ; Morgan v. Louisiana, 1,18
US. 455 (1886); New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
268. 228 U.S. at 556-57.
269. 185 U.S. 296 (1902).
270. 228 U.S. at 557.
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Citing both Spanish law and the remoteness of the islands, 27 1 he decided that
no "other grounds" for attacking the deportation existed. Thus, the Governor
General's act was a legitimate act of state, not subject to judicial review.
272
To read Tiaco to sanction unlimited power to expel summarily without
judicial review is to reach a result not justified by the prior cases dealing with
the right of aliens to test their right to remain, 272 and not required by Tiaco's
facts. The view that there need be no hearing in expulsion cases has been
discarded by subsequent decisions.2 74 Even in Tiaco the aliens obtained a full
review of the question of whether the deportation was a legitimate exercise
of governmental power. The only certain conclusion from the case is that it
involved a peculiar factual situation, rested upon special legal bases, and thus
can shed little if any light on the problem of congressional power to expel
on the mainland.
275
Bugajewitz and the Pitfalls of Terseness. In Bugaiewitz v. Adams 270 the
Court considered section 3 of the 1907 act as altered by the 1910 amend-
ments. 2 77 The record showed that Bugajewitz was
an alien; that she entered the United States not later than January 4,
1905, and that she was arrested on August 3, 1910 .... [The order of
arrest] recited that she was then a prostitute and inmate of a house of
prostitution, and that she was a prostitute at the time of entry and entered
the United States for the purpose of prostitution or for an immoral pur-
pose . . . [She denied] that she was a prostitute at the time of entry,
or that she entered for any of the purposes alleged .... 278
Thus, the Government's theory was that Bugajewitz was erroneously ad-
mitted, while her defense was that she was properly admitted, and that what-
271. Ibid.
272. Id. at 558.
273. E.g., Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U.S. 8 (1908) ; The Japanese Immigrant
Case, 189 U.S. 86 (1903); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
274. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 UjS. 206 (1953)
(dictum) ; Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
275. The so-called "Insular Cases," Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.,S. 298 (1922) ; Dorr
v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 (1903);
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), with which Tiaco belongs historically, were
recently limited to their special historical setting in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13 (1957).
Mr. Justice Black's views on limitation of constitutional rights in times of emergency
are particularly apropos:
Neither the cases nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion. The
concept that the Bill of Rights and other constitutional protections against arbi-
trary government are inoperative when they become inconvenient or when ex-
pediency dictates otherwise is a very dangerous doctrine and if allowed to flourish
would destroy the benefit of a written Constitution and undermine the basis of our
Government.
Id. at 14.
276. 228 U.S. 585 (1913).
277. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 899, as amended, Act of March 26,
1910, ch. 128, § 2, 36 Stat. 265.
278. 228 U.S. at 590.
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ever her present condition, it arose subsequent to entry. To this Mr. justice
Holmes replied that "we must take it, at least, that she is a prostitute now." 270
The almost universal reading of this condemning statement is that there is
no question regarding congressional power to expel for unsavory acts occur-
ring subsequent to entry. An equally legitimate interpretation, however, is
that since Bugajewitz was admittedly then a prostitute, she was, prima fade
at least, deemed to have entered as a prostitute. This position is all the more
plausible in view of Holmes' dissent in Keller, which dealt with the power
of Congress to raise a conclusive presumption of erroneous admittance from
postentry conduct.
280
Since Bugajewitz had not been apprehended until over five years after entry
and had alleged proper admittance, it might have been expected that her
counsel would argue that the presumption was invalid in her case. But his
constitutional contentions were limited to the assertion of alleged denials of
her procedural rights-that she was being deported for a crime and had been
deprived of a judicial hearing.281 It is probably safe to surmise, therefore, that
Bugajewitz could offer no conclusive proof that she had not entered as a
prostitute. Thus, her position was analogous to that of the Chinese laborers
in Fong Yue Ting, and the statute may be viewed as a valid regulation of
immigration as applied to her..
28 2
Thus, the brusque conclusion of the opinion is subject to an interpretation
different from the one that has been generally accepted. Mr. Justice Holmes'
words were:
The attempt to reopen the constitutional question must fail. It is thorough-
ly established that Congress has power to order the deportation of aliens
whose presence in the country it deems hurtful. The determination by
facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of
a crime, nor is deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want. The coincidence
of the local penal law with the policy of Congress is an accident. Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707, 728, 730. Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U:S. 228, 231. Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275.
Tiaco v. Forbes .... The prohibition of ex post facto laws in Article 1,
§ 9, has no application, Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 242,
and with regard to the petitioner, it is not necessary to construe the
statute as having any retrospective effect.
28 3
The previous analysis of the cases cited has shown that none of them in-
volved upholding an exercise of the power to expel against substantive due
process objections. Admittedly, some of the language of Fong Yue Ting at
the locations cited seems at first glance to point to such a result. But the
279. Ibid.
280. See text at note 193 supra. On the record in Keller, the woman involved did not
become a -prostitute until almost three years after her entry. 213 U.S. at 147.
281. 228 U.S. at 586-89.
282. Compare text at notes 102-04 supra.
283. 228 U.S. at 591.
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specific citations to Wong Wing and Zakonaite involved only procedural mat-
ters, and, as has been noted, Tiaco is not clear authority for the existence of
unlimited sovereign power. It would seem that if Holmes had intended to
decide substantive due process questions, he would have considered Keller
relevant. Indeed, since the substantive issue was not raised by counsel, and
since its consideration was not necessarily required by the statute, the assump-
tion that it was disposed of is unjustified without some positive indication
other than the cases cited. But the language of the opinion does not provide
such an indication.
By refusing to "reopen the constitutional question" Mr. Justice Holmes
implied that he felt he was confronted with a closed issue. But the issue of
substantive limits, which Bugajewitz is now assumed to have settled, had been
left open in Keller and was still open. Moreover, it cannot reasonably be con-
tended that there is only one possible constitutional issue involved in the
banishment of long-term, lawful permanent residents. "The constitutional
question" to which Holmes referred must have been the procedural due proc-
ess issue raised by counsel for Bugajewitz. That issue was settled by all four
of the cases relied on. If this interpretation is correct, then the immediately
subsequent statement, regarding the power of Congress to expel aliens "whose
presence ... it deems hurtful," should not be read to countenance unlimited
power. 2 4 In the context in which the statement is made, it can be argued
that Holmes intended to go no farther than the point decided in Zakonaite-
that Congress' power to prescribe valid regulations of immigration is not
limited by the coincidence of such regulations with state criminal law.
The concluding sentence offers further evidence that the facts on which a
substantive due process issue could have been raised and decided were not
before the Court. Holmes relied on the Jdhannessen 2M case to dispose of the
ex post facto problem. Johannessen dealt with the power to denaturalize one
who had obtained citizenship by fraud concerning length of residence, and
concluded that since Jobannessen's constitutional status was never properly
acquired, he could not object on the grounds of retroactivity to legislation
which deprived him of that status. 28 6 This citation would seem inapposite if
the Court in Bugajewitz was dealing with a lawful permanent resident. On
the other hand, reliance on Johannessen is consistent with the theory that
Bugajewitz-to put the case most strongly in her favor-could not prove that
she had not been erroneously admitted. If her status as a resident was con-
sidered to have been obtained erroneously, it becomes clear why she could not
284. Admittedly, it has been so understood. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 536
(1952); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922). See also H.R. 9766, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. (1940), a bill to expel Harry Bridges, "whose presence in this country
the Congress deems hurtful." The bill passed the House but was defeated in committee
in the Senate. Its supporters relied on Tiaco. See S. REP. No. 2031, 76th Cong., 3d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 5-9 (1940).
285. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
286. Id. at 242-43.
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rely on the constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws, and how Holmes
was able to say that "with regard to the petitioner it is not necessary to con-
strue the statute as having any retrospective effect." 287
This last statement cannot easily be reconciled with the theory that the case
dealt with the status of a lawful permanent resident. Bugajewitz entered the
country "not later than January 4, 1905."2 s By January 5, 1908, therefore,
she was immune from ejection under the 1907 statute.289 She was arrested
less than five months after the three-year limitation period was eliminated by
the 1910 amendments. If the Court had considered her a properly admitted
resident, the retrospective effect of the statute would seem impossible to deny.
Only by hypothesizing that the Court assumed that Bugajewitz was exclud-
able as a prostitute under the 1903 act 290 at the time of her entry is the con-
clusion understandable.
It is, of course, possible that Holmes' views on the extent of congressional
power over aliens bad significantly changed since his Keller dissent, and that
he was ready to accept the idea of banishment for postentry acts, whether or
not connected with preentry conditions.29 1 Before this conclusion is reached,
however, it should be noted that Holmes apparently regarded prostitutes as
suffering from permanent personal defects. 292 This theory undoubtedly colored
his thinking about the validity of the conclusive presumption of erroneous
admittance as applied in this case. Thus, he might well have accepted a pre-
sumption unlimited in time and based on the alien's present activities, and still
not approved of present-day statutes which provide for banishment on the
basis of activities neither related to preentry characteristics nor presently car-
ried on.
293
But it seems more likely that Holmes simply did not consider that the
validity of the presumption was at issue in Bugaewitz.29 4 The internal evi-
287. 228 U.S. at 591.
238. Id. at 590.
289. Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1.134, 34 Stat. 900.
290. Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 2, 32 Stat. 1214.
291. He may well have been willing to accept a longer limitation period. Cf. Luria
v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913) (presumption in denaturalization cases).
292. See Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 10 (1915). This "once a prostitute, always a
prostitute" approach is similar to the rationale behind the expulsion provisions concern-
ing crimes involving moral turpitude. See S. REP. No. 352, 64th Cong., Ist Sess. 15
(1916), reporting on the Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874, which enacted the first
"moral turpitude" expulsion clause. This rationale, while it may be open to criticism on
policy grounds, is consistent with the conditional entry theory of expulsion.
293. As an example, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 163, 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-503 (1952), in addition to the well known provisions relating to Com-
munists, 66 Stat. 205, 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (b)'(c) (1952), authorizes deportation of aliens
who have at any time been convicted of possessing a sawed-off shotgun, 66 Stat. 207, 8
U.S.C. § 1251(a) (14) (1952).
294. Possibly counsel for Bugajewitz was incompetent or negligent in failing to press
the substantive due process issue. That this significantly affected the opinion seems im-
probable for Holmes disposed of the question of legislative intent with respect to the
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dence of the opinion strongly indicates that he assumed the presence of an
erroneously admitted alien. In any event, the theory advanced here is certain-
ly a tenable explanation of a terse opinion which, to say the least, demands
interpretation.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing analysis it can be seen that the legislation approved
in the pre-1917 cases dealt with illegally or erroneously admitted aliens.2 95
With the issue of substantive due process seldom squarely raised, it was per-
haps inevitable that the Supreme Court should use language describing the
scope of the power to expel in broad terms. But Holmes' definition of the
scope of the power shows that congressional regulation of aliens might well
be substantively limited in spite of the Court's earlier use of phrases such as
"inherent sovereignty.$
296
Congress' continued assertions of wider power since 1917 have been met,
however, not with the imposition of substantive limits, but with the continued
repetition of the inherent sovereignty formula. The post-1917 transition from
ejection to banishment will be treated in the second Article.
removal of the three-year limitation in § 3 of the act without the issue being raised by
counsel. 228 U.S. at 590-91. If the facts were such that a serious question of the appli-
cation of the conclusive presumption had been presented, therefore, he probably would
have raised this far more basic argument, as he had previously indicated in Keller that
three years was close to the line of constitutional validity.
295. Two post-Bugajewitz cases, Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291 (1914); Lapina v.
Williams, 232 U.S. 78 (1914), involved aliens expelled within three years of reentry into
the United States. In each case, the alien was excludable at the time of reentry.
296. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138, 149-51 (1.909) (dissenting opinion) ; see
text at notes 189-97 supra.
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